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RÉSUMÉ 
Les écologistes du comportement se sont sati sfaits de l'approche évolutive pour 
prédire et expliquer le comportement animal. Lorsqu 'on étudie les comportements 
fl ex ibles l'approche évolutive en générale, et l' approche des jeux évoluti fs en 
parti culi er, supposent que le mécani sme psychologique comp01t emental sous-jacent 
e.g. l' apprenti ssage, n' empêche pas l'express ion de comportements adaptés; une 
suppos ition connue sous !' intitulée du «pari comportemental». Ce pari , cependant, 
pourrait être inva lide, surtout si le mécani sme en questi on est soumis aux press ions 
découlant des conséquences de diffé rents systèmes comportementaux. Des études 
récentes prétendent que l'étude des mécani smes psychologiques peut générer de 
meilleures compréhensions et prédictions que celles des modèles évolutifs . Je cro is en 
conséquence que dans certaines circonstances l' apprenti ssage peut être autant, voire 
plus puissant, que l'évolution pour prédire le comportement animal. J' ai adopté troi s 
mesures pour tester cette hypothèse: 1) je propose un modèle d'apprenti ssage pour un 
jeu producteur chapardeur, un jeu d' approv isionnement soc ial qui a été bien étudié en 
éco logie comportementale. Les résultats de ce modèle recoupent presque tous les 
résultats empiriques et les prédictions théoriques qui ont été publiés pour le jeu 
producteur chapardeur à ce jour de sorte qu ' il fournit un outil prédi cti f plus général 
qu 'aucun des modèles évolutifs ex istant pour des conditions de fréquence 
dépendance . De plus, le modèle d'apprentissage génère une prédicti on inédite à 
l'effet que la fréquence de chapardeur devrait s'accroitre avec la variance dans la 
qualité des parcell es . 2) J' ai testé cette nouvelle prédi ction avec des groupes capti fs 
de diamants mandarins (Taeniopygia guttata) avec des conditions de parcelles de 
qualité fi xe ou variable. J'ai trouvé qu 'à mesure que les individus accumulent de 
l'expérience dans la condition vari able, la fréquence de chapardeur augmente. Ce 
résultat appui le modèle. 3) J' ai exploré les conditions sous lesquelles on s' attend à ce 
que l'apprenti ssage évolue dans un contexte fréquence dépendant afin de permettre 
aux écologistes du comportement de comprendre les situations où ! ' apprenti ssage 
sera présent. En fa isant ce la j ' ai pu étudier les propriétés évo lutives des règles 
d'apprenti ssage tout en palliant à deux limitations d'études précédentes : en 
confrontant les règles d'apprenti ssages à des stratégies fixes et en évaluant les effets 
de variations environnementales intra et intergénérationnell es. J'ai trouvé que malgré 
les bénéfi ces marginaux de l'apprenti ssage comparé aux stratégies fi xes, 
l' apprenti ssage n' arri ve pas à se répandre à l' ensemble de la population dans des 
environnements dynamiques. Ma thèse démontre donc que lorsqu 'on s' intéresse au 
comportement au niveau de la population dans un environnement statique, les 
XX 
écologistes du comportement peuvent continuer faire le pari comportemental et 
supposer que le mécanisme psychologique qui sous-tend le comportement produira le 
même résultat que celui attendu par le processus évolutif. Cependant, si on s' intéresse 
au comportement individuel et qu ' il s ' agit d ' un environnement fluctuant, alors le pari 
peut être risqué et il serait mieux de tenir compte du mécanisme d ' apprentissage. 
Mots-clés: écologie comportementale, pari comportemental , prise de décision, théorie 
des jeux évolutive, sélection fréquence-dépendante, règle d ' apprentissage, opérateur 
linéaire, stratégie mixte, polymorphisme, producteur-chapardeur, stratégie pure, 
sensibilité au risque, approvisionnement social , diamants mandarins (Taeniopygia 
guttata). 
ABSTRACT 
Behav ioral ecologists have been comfortable predicting and explaining animal 
behav ior fro m an evo lutionary approach. When studying fl ex ible behav iors, 
evolutionary approaches in general and evolutionary game theory in part icular 
implicitly assume that the underl ying psychological mechanism, e.g. learn ing, does 
not constrain the expression of the adaptive behav ior: an assum pti on known as the 
behav ioral gambit. The gambit, however, may not be va lid, espec ially if the 
mechanism is under selection pressure fro m the outcomes of multiple behav ior 
systems. Recent studies claim that focusing instead on the psychological mechani sm 
can prov ide new insights and predictions that could not have been made from 
evo lutionary models. 1 thus believe that in some contexts learning is as powerful as, 
or perhaps even more powerful than, evolution in predi cting animal behav ior. I have 
taken three steps to explore thi s hypothes is: 1) 1 proposed a learning based model fo r 
producer-scrounger game, a soc ial forag ing game that has been extensive ly studied in 
behav ioral eco logy. The results replicate almost every producer-scrounger prediction 
and experimental result published to date such that it provides a more general too l 
than any single game-theoretic model to predict behav ior under frequency-dependent 
conditions. This model, furthermore, prov ided a novel prediction: an increase in 
scrounging behav ior when patch quality varies. 2) 1 tested thi s new predi ction using 
captive fo raging fl ocks of male zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata) with variable and 
nonvariable patch quality. 1 fo und that as individuals gain experience in the variable 
environment, they increase their scrounging behav ior. Thi s supports the model. 3) 1 
explored the conditions under which learning is expected to evol ve in a frequency-
dependent context to guide behav ioral eco logists as to where one should expect 
learning. ln doing so, 1 studied the evo lutionary properties of learning rules and 
addressed both limitations of earlier studies by pitting fi xed against learning agents 
while exploring the effects within and between-generation fluctuations. 1 found that 
despite the marginal benefits of learning over fi xed strategies in dynamic 
envi ronments, learning never goes to fixat ion. The thesis shows that when the 
research in terest is in the population level behav ior in a stati c environment, 
behav ioral ecologist can continue using the behavioral gambit and assume that the 
mechani sm in a frequency-dependent situations will produce outcomes that are the 
same as those from an evolutionary process. However, if the interest is in individual 
level behav ior or invo lves environmental fluctuations, the gambit may be incomplete 
and learning should be considered. 
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Keywords: behavioral ecology, behavioral gambit, decision making, evolutionary 
game theory, frequency-dependent selection, learning rule, linear operator, mixed 
strategy, polymorphism, producer-scrounger, pure strategy, risk sensitivity, social 
foraging, zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata) 
INTRODUCTION 
0. 1 Behav ioral ecology 
You see a pigeon, in the middle of a fl ock on the ground, standing and watching other 
birds while they are walking and looking at the ground to find food. Why does the 
animal do thi s? Tinbergen (1963) suggested fo ur types of answers to thi s questi on: 
immediate causation, development ( ontogeny), adaptive value (survival fonction), 
and evo lutionary history. Immediate causation explains the behav ior based on the 
underlying phys iological mechanisms that are invo lved in perfo rming the behav ior. 
Development explains the behavior in relati on to earl y experiences in the animal ' s 
li fe. Adaptive value, however, explains the behav ior based on the utility of the 
behav ior in re lat ion to the animal' s natural surroundings. Finally, evo lutionary history 
explains the behav ior of thi s animal based on the behav iors of its ancestors. Focusing 
on the adaptive value of a behav ior, behav ioral eco logy has emerged from ethology to 
study the evolutionary basis fo r animal behav ior due to past eco logical pressures 
(Danchin, Giraldeau, & Cézilly, 2008) 
Evo lution has trad itionally been the fondamenta l theory in behaviora l eco logy 
(Da vies, Krebs, & West, 201 2). When behav ioral eco logists want to explain or 
predict an animal' s behav ior, they usually corne up with a model that shows that 
animal does X (and not Y) because X maximizes its fitn ess, overall survival and 
reproduction. By considering costs and benefits assoc iated with alternati ve options, 
we have been able fo r the past 30-40 years to make detailed predictions of animal 
behavior of which many have been supported empirically (Danchin et al. , 2008 ; 
Dav ies et al. , 20 12; Stephens & Krebs, 1986) . 
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0.1.1 Phenotypic gambit 
Applying an economical view to animal behavior problems requires two implicit 
assumptions. First, the genetic architecture of an organism does not constrain which 
phenotype can evolve, known as the phenotypic gambit (Fawcett, Hamblin , & 
Giraldeau, 2013 ; Grafen, 1984). For example, if a clutch size of six eggs is optimal 
then we should expect to see a similar clutch size in nature, regardless of what the 
evolutionary pathway to reaching this optimal solution has been. ln behavioral 
ecology, we do not often question the phenotypic gambit and when the prediction of 
the mode! faits , the first thing we verify are the details of the mode! to see if its 
predictions could be improved, for example by adding a factor to make it more 
realistic. 
Accepting the phenotypic gambit has proven to be a good way to simplify problems 
and corne up with powerful models and predictions, especially about fixed behaviors, 
such as clutch size. Adaptation , however, occurs not only through genetic evolution 
but also through changes that take place within an individual's lifetime via 
psychological mechanisms such as learning (Shettleworth, 2010). There is th us an 
extension of the phenotypic gambit for flexible behaviors. 
0.1 .2 Behavioral gambit 
The second implicit assumption resulting from applying an economical v1ew to 
animal behavior problems is that for flexible behaviors, i.e. where the behavior can be 
adjusted in response to the behavior of others (Fawcett et al. , 2013), the psychological 
mechanism does not constrain the expression of the adaptive behavior, known as 
behavioral gambit (Giraldeau & Dubois, 2008). Whatever the optimal outcome 
expected from an evolutionary perspective, we can thus assume the animal will 
express it, even for behaviors generated by adaptive decision making. The behavioral 
gambit simplifies the problem by neglecting the mechanism and focusing on the 
fonction. 
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However, we can think of at least two reasons that behavioral ecologists should be 
cautious with the behavioral gambit. First, the behavioral gambit may fail; that is the 
mechanism may constrain the optimal behavior. For example, if three different 
behaviors, such as foraging, mate choice, and nest building, operate according to a 
corn mon underlying mechanism such as learning, the overall outcome of these three 
behaviors applies selection pressure on the mechanism. The mechanism, however, 
may not maximize each behavior independently because different behaviors may 
require different or conflicting optimization mechanisms. For example, foraging 
behavior may favor an exploratory trait while such a trait may not be optimal for mate 
choice. Natural selection thus favors a mechanism that finds an optimal compromise 
for these behaviors and maximizes the overall outcome. ln this case, an evolutionary 
mode! that accepts the behavioral gambit may be handicapped in predicting or 
explaining the optimality of the animal's foraging behavior. 
Second, by focusing on the psychological mechanism, we can obtain new insights 
about the behavior and we can corne with predictions that we could not have made 
had we not focused on the mechanism. The first part of this study demonstrates a 
mode! based on learning that is shown to be more effective than evolutionary models 
in predicting the social foraging behaviors of ground feeding birds (Chapter I) . 
Considering these two reasons it is thus important to examine the extent and 
ecological conditions that allow the behavioral gambit to be accepted, that is to 
continue ignoring the underlying mechanism for the flexible adaptive behavior. 
0.1 .3 Evolution and learning 
Based on the speed of adaptation, different types of adaptation can be generally 
categorized into physiological adaptation , learning, and evolution. Unlike the 
functional raie of a physiological adaptation, its underlying mechanisms, such as 
chemical and hormonal reactions, are of no particular interest to behavioral ecology. 
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Learning that happens during the lifetime of an individual, however, has a complex 
relation with evolution. 
Learning can be broadly defined as "a change in state due to experience. [ ... ] The 
changes in state referred to as learning seem to involve a change in cognitive state, 
not just behavioral potential" (Shettleworth, 2010). There is much debate about the 
relationship between evolution and learning, and their roles in animais adaptation 
(Baldwin, 1896; Bateson, 2004; Carroll , Hendry, Reznick, & Fox, 2007; Duckworth, 
2008; Hinton & Nowlan, 1987; Kawecki , 2009; Levey et al. , 2009; Luniak, 2004; 
Nolfi & Floreano, 1999; Suzuki & Arita, 2004). Learning can inhibit the selection 
pressure and hence evolution by allowing an animal to adopt an adaptive response to 
a completely nove! situation that had never been encountered in the evolutionary 
history of the species. Learning is thus thought to generally slow down the rate of 
evolutionary change because behavioral plasticity can shield organisms from strong 
directional selection (Duckworth, 2008). 
On the other hand, learning is also argued to accelerate evolution because it allows 
individuals to survive and hence maintains genetic diversity within the population. 
The increased diversity increases the likelihood of evolution if a new adaptive 
unlearned phenotype occurs. This mutant with unlearned behavior will spread in the 
population, replacing the learning phenotype by virtue of the saved costs that are 
required of learning: a process known as genetic assimilation (Bateson, 2004). 
Selection of the best learners, therefore, would eventually result in the appearance of 
fixed behavior occurring entirely in the absence of learning (Price, Qvarnstrom, & 
Irwin, 2003; Shimada, Ishii , & Shibao, 201 O; Tebbich, Sterelny, & Teschke, 2010). 
Learning can thus enhance the path of evolution (Suzuki & Arita, 2004). 
0.2 Learning can be as powerful as evolution to predict some animal behavior 
Despite the complex relation between learning and evolution , the mechanism has 
remained neglected in behavioral ecology. Moreover, behavioral ecologists do not 
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commonly di stinguish between evolutionary and behav ioral decisions. Mechani sms 
of dec ision, hence, remain ill exp lored, except perhaps for the occas ional attention 
devoted to learning rules: a mathematical express ion fo r behav ioral decisions (Aoki 
& Feldman, 2014; Arbil ly, Motro, Feldman, & Lotem, 20 11 ; Dridi & Lehmann , 
201 4; Dubois, Morand-Ferron, & Giraldeau, 201 O; Fawcett et al., 20 14; Grof3 et al., 
2008; Hamblin & Giraldeau, 2009; Katsnelson, Motro, Feldman, & Lotem, 20 12; 
Kolodny, Edelman, & Lotem, 2014; Lotem & Bi ran-Yoeli , 2014; Rende!! et al., 
201 O; Trimmer, McNamara, Houston,. & Marshall , 201 2). Learning ru les are often 
composed of info rmation updating and dec ision making components and fo r several 
decades each has been studied separately and sometimes even misinterpreted. 
Moreover, little attention has been devoted to exploring the eco logical condi tions 
under which dec ision should be based on learning. 
1 however believe that in some context learning is as powerful as, perhaps even more 
powerful , than evolution in predicting animal behav ior. To explore thi s hypothes is, 1 
have taken three steps that 1 will explain in more details in the fo llowing chapters: 
1. 1 proposed a learning-based mode! fo r producer-scrounger game, a social 
foraging behav ior that has been extensively studied in behav ioral eco logy. 1 
then compared the results of the mode! with prev iously published models, 
experiments, and observation. This mode!, furthermore, provided nove! 
prediction concerning an increase in scrounging behav ior when patch quality 
van es. 
2. 1 tested this new prediction using captive fo raging fl ocks of male zebra 
finches (Taeniopygia guttata) in two conditions with variable and non-
variable patch quality. The results show that as individuals gain experience in 
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the variable environment, they increase their scrounging behaviour. This 
support of the mode! emphasizes the power of the learning ru le approach in 
studying animal behavior. 
3. To identify situations where one should look for learning, 1 explored the 
conditions under which learning is expected to evolve in a frequency-
dependent context like a producer-scrounger-game. ln doing so, l studied the 
evolutionary properties of learning ru les and addressed both limitations of 
earlier studies by pitting fixed against learning agents white exploring the 
effects of a no fluctuations , within or between-generation fluctuations. 
ln the remaining of this chapter, l review earlier studies in behavioral ecology 
concerning learning and decision rule. 
0.3 State of knowledge 
0.3. l Frequency-dependency, tactic and strategy 
One circumstance in which learning could play a rote as important as evolution, is 
when individuals adjust in a frequency-dependent context, where the payoff of a 
tactic depends on the combined frequency of ail tactics used in the group 
simultaneously (Maynard Smith, 1982). Tactics are known as the behavioral 
components of a strategy (Krebs & Davies, 1993), e.g. wander vs. defend, or the 
alternative phenotypes generated by a strategy or decision rule (Gross, 1996; 
Tomkins & Hazel , 2007), such as fight with probability 0.3 and sneak with 
probability 0.7. The word "strategy" has been used differently over time . For 
example, Krebs & Davies (1993) defined strategy as what animais do when 
competing for a scarce resource (Krebs & Davies, 1993), e.g. if young, wander; if 
old, defend a territory. Houston & McNamara (2005), however, defined strategy as a 
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rule for choosing a tactic as a fonction of state and possibly time. Strategy sometimes 
has been defined as a genetically based decision rule that results in the allocation of 
the somatic and reproductive effort of an organism, such as energy and development, 
among alternative phenotypes (Gross, 1996; Tomkins & Hazel , 2007) , e.g. fight if 
larger than X and sneak if smaller than X, or fight with prob. 0.3 and sneak with prob. 
0.7. Throughout this document, tactic and action refer to the same concept. l use the 
definition by Krebs & Davies (1993) for tactic and Houston & McNamara's (2005) 
definition for strategy: 
• Tactic (Action): The behavioral components of a strategy (e.g. search, join, 
eat) 
• Strategy: A ru le for choosing a tactic as a fonction of state and possibly time 
(e.g. join early in the morning and search other times, search ail the time) 
What becomes a tactic or a strategy can depend on how and at which level we are 
asking a question about the behavior. If one asks, for instance, how does a ground 
feeding birdfindfood, then either "search" for a new patch or "join" a patch already 
found by others become possible tactics. In this case, possible strategies can be "use 
only one tactic (pure)" or "join with probability of 0.7 (mixed)". If, however, the 
question is: how should an individual forage in a dynamic environment, then the 
tactics can be either pure or mixed. ln such a situation the strategies can become 
"A lways use mixed" or "use mixed on/y if patch richness varies". Hence, depending 
on the question, the exact definition of expressions such as pure or mixed can be 
either tactic or strategy. 
0.3.2 Evolutionary game theory 
When different tactics are not simultaneously compatible in a single individual, but 
are simultaneously compatible in a population, there will be a stable equilibrium 
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number of individuals playing each tactic. Maynard Smith (1982) says this 
equilibrium can be reached through pure strategies or mixed strategies. ln a pure 
strategy, individuals choose one action because, as a result of small size, lack of 
experience, etc. , they cannot effectively perform any other. ln a mixed strategy, the 
payoffs of actions depend on the frequencies with which they are performed (Table 
0.1 a). He also introduces .the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) which 
is a strategy (or a combination of tactics) which, once fixed in a population, cannot be 
invaded by any other strategy (or combination of tactics ). 
Krebs & Davies ( 1993) redefined the pure strategy (as a polymorphism), mixed 
strategy, and also add behavioral assessment as the third type of solution (Table 
0.1 b). In a polymorphism, different individuals play different strategies and the 
frequencies of the morphs will be fixed by frequency dependent selection. A 
polymorphism may arise because of genetic differences or environmental differences. 
In a mixed ESS, individuals play a combination of different strategies in a proportion 
that satisfies the ESS. In behavioral assessment, instead of having a fixed population-
wide ru le, every individual is flexible and bases its decision on an assessment of what 
others in the population are doing. Examples of having ESS in a popu1ation are 
shown in Table 0.2. 
Gross ( 1996) considered differences in individual state, e.g. energy level, and 
proposed a new "conditional strategy" that switches tactics depending on individual 
state (Table O. 1 c ). In this classification, alternative and mixed strategies are very 
similar to the pure and mixed strategies in Krebs & Da vies ( 1993). In the conditional 
strategy an individual changes its behavior in response to changes in its internai state, 
which can be frequency dependent or independent. Here, the tactic related to each 
state is genetically determined. Throughout this document, 1 will not consider 
differences in individual state and will use the terminology of Krebs & Davies 
(1993). 
9 
For both pure strategies (polymorphism) and mixed strategies, selecti on pressure is 
on the decision, i.e. the equilibrium or switching point is determined by natura l 
selection. The strategy thus remains the same during an individual's li fetime. In 
behav ioral assessment, however, an individual changes its behav ior fl exi bly during its 
li fetime by using a dec ision rule, and selection pressure acts on the dec ision rule. 
--------------------------------- ---·--- ------ ---
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Table 0.1 Different ways of having ESS in a population proposed by: a) 
Maynard smith (1982), b) Krebs & Davies (1993), c) Gross (1996) 
(a) 
Pure strategy 
- Fixed behavior 
- Genetie polymorphism 
seleets one taetie beeause 
others are not possible 
Polymorphism 
- Fixed behavior 
- Frequeney dependent 
seleetion 
- Two or more strategies with 
unequal payoffs beeause of 
genetie differenees or 
environmental differenees 
Alternative strategies 
- Genetie polymorphism 
- Frequeney dependent 
seleetion 
- Two or more strategies with 
equal average fitness 
- Evolutionarily Stable State 
Frequeney 
Mixed strategy 
- Fixed behavior 
- Frequeney dependent 
seleetion aets to equalize the 
payoffs for different taeties 
(b) 
Mixed strategy 
- Fixed behavior 
- Frequeney dependent 
seleetion 
- One strategy: different taeties 
in a proportion that satisfies the 
mixed ESS with equal payoffs 
(e) 
Mixed strategy 
(with alternative tactics) 
- Genetie monomorphism 
- Frequeney dependent 
seleetion 
- One strategy: taeties with 
equal average fitness 
- Evolutionarily Stable 
Strategy Frequeney 
Behavioral assessment 
- Flexible behavior 
- Frequeney dependent 
seleetion 
- Two or more strategies with 
equal payoffs 
Conditional strategy 
(with alternative tactics) 
- Genetie monomorphism 
- Status dependent seleetion 
(with/out frequeney dependent 
selëetion) 
- One strategy: taeties with 
unequal average fitness 
- Evolutionarily Stable 
Strategy Switeh point 
Table 0.2 Examples of having an ESS in a population 
Strategy equilibrium by 
Polymorphism 
(Pure strategies /Alternatives) 
Mixed strategy 
Behavioral assessment 
Example 
Sex: male vs. female 
Male Coho salmon: jack vs. hooknose 
Male fig wasp: fight vs. disperse 
Male stickleback throat: bright red vs. dull 
Reproduction in hermaphrodite organisms 
Female digger wasp: dig vs. enter 
Finch & pigeon: producer vs. scrounger 
Male bullfrog: calier vs. satellite 
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0.3 .3 Learning rule 
Decision rules assign the probability of displaying different tactics. If the probability 
of playing a tactic is based on previous experience, it is called a learning ru le (Harley, 
1981 ; Kacelnik & Krebs, 1985 ; Stephens, 1991). Learning rules typically have two 
components, one that forms an estimate of the value of alternative tactics from 
experience, and another that decides on a tactic based on these estimates. The 
approach can be traced to Estes ( 1950) who proposed the first statistical theory of 
learning. ln a series of papers, Bush and Mosteller developed the linear operator 
model for learning that is based on previous experiences (Bush & Mosteller, 1951 a, 
1951 b, 1953 , 1955 ; Mosteller, 1958). ln these primary models, only the occurrence of 
an event, i.e . experiencing a reward or a punishment, is important and the size of the 
reward or punishment is not considered. This means that reçeiving a big reward is not 
different from receiving a small reward. 
The linear operator model has been modified (Table 0.3) and attention has 
specifically been directed to the decision component (Killeen, 1984; Krebs , Kacelnik, 
& Taylor, 1978; Lea & Dow, 1984; Lester, 1984; McNamara & Houston , 1985 ; 
Myerson & Miezin, 1980; Ollason, 1980; Pulliam & Dunford, 1980) in an effort to 
reconcile learning rules with phenomena such as ideal free distribution (Krebs & 
Davies, 1993), matching ratio (Herrnstein, 1961 , 1970; Herrnstein & Heyman, 1979), 
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), evolutionarily stable (ES) learning rule , and rule 
. for ESS (Hines & Bishop, 1983; Maynard Smith, 1982). Looking for the ES learning 
ru le, Harley (1981) modified the linear operator by adding residuals to the estimation 
component (Table 0.3 ). These residual s simulate innate values for different options 
that provide an absolute floor below which the estimates of alternatives cannot go. 
The residuals according to him insure that ail options get sampled at least periodically 
and he claimed that the deci sion component should be based on the matching ratio, 
i.e. allocating responses to alternative in proportion to their relative estimated 
payoffs. He claimed that this rule, called the relative payoff sum, is an evolutionary 
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stable learning rule. This incited a debate between Harley and Houston (Harley, 1983, 
1987; Houston, 1983; Houston & Sumida, 1987) on the opti mality of relative payoff 
sum, and more specificall y the optimality of the matching ratio, when compared to 
other learning rules such as linear operator and perfect memory (Table 0.3). 
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Table 0.3 Selected important learning rules in behavioral ecology. Here, only 
the updating part is mentioned. Depending on the experiment, either matching 
or maximizing was used for decision making. T;(t) is the estimated value of tactic 
i at time t. P;(t) is the observed payoff for tactic i at time t. xis the memory factor 
(1- xis the learning rate) used to adjust the estimation with new experience. 
Learning rule 
Pulliam & Dunford's 
linear operator 
(Pulliam & Dunford, 
1980) 
Relative Payoff Sum 
(Harley, 1981 ) 
Lester's linear operator 
(Lester, 1984) 
Dual process 
(Kacelnik & Krebs, 
1985) 
Perfect memory 
(Houston & Sumida, 
1987) 
For.muta 
T;(t) = x.T;(t-1) + (1-x).P;(t) 
Ti(t) = x.Ti(t-1) + (1-x).n + Pi(t) 
Ti(t) = P;(t).T;(t-1) 
Ti(t) = x.T;(t-1) + (1-x).n + P;(t) 
C;(t) = C;(t-1).(l-T;(t-1))'1 
A;(t) = T;(t).C;(t) 
a+ LP;(t) 
T (t) = ----'-1 -
; /J+N;(t) 
Description 
r; is the res idual value for 
tactic i representing the innate 
value for that tactic. 
n is the time passed since the 
last time tactic i gave payoff. 
C;(t) is a mechanism to 
decrease preference to tactic i 
if it does not pay back for a 
wh ile. 
A,(t) is the total estimated 
value for tactic i at time t used 
in deci sion making. 
a and fJ are the parameter of 
learning rules and same values 
are used for different tactics. 
N;(t) is the number oftimes 
tactic i is used until time t. 
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Regelmann ( 1984) used the relative payoff sum in simulations of the ideal free 
distribution and ideal despotic distribution , where some animais are good competitors 
while the others are poor in competition and good in defending a food source. He 
extended relative payoff sum with and without travelling cost between food patches 
and used equal values for ai l residuals. The distribution of individuals among 
different patches was very close to that predicted by the matching ratio . Experiments 
by Milinski ( 1984) show that stickleback behavior in a foraging context is consistent 
with the predictions of Harley's and Regelmann ' s relative payoff sum . Based on the 
experiment and the reported results , however, linear operator, which was not 
considered by Milinski , could also explain the results. 
Lester (1984) proposed a simplified version of linear operator (Table 0.3) based on 
the matching ratio where the pro babil ity of displaying each behavior is proportional 
to its relative profitability, i.e. prey/time. Kacelnik & Krebs (1985) compared 
Harley's relative payoff sum, Lester's linear operator, and a proposed dual-process 
decision ru le similar to linear operator (Table 0.3) in three series of experiments with 
sticklebacks, goldfish , and starlings ail in foraging contexts. They claim that the 
relative payoff sum and Lester's linear operator are not good when there is rapid patch 
depletion, and that models based on simple averages of the past and present 
experience are insufficient to describe some important features of the way changes in 
food availabi li ty are detected by experimental animais. This paper was followed by a 
survey of learning rules (Kacelnik, Krebs, & Ens, 1987) comparing Pulliam & 
Dunford (1980) ' s linear operator (Table 0.3), Harley' s relative payoff sum, Lester ' s 
linear operator, the dual-process decision ru le, and Ki lleen ( l 984)'s incentive theory 
where memory factor is also updated by linear operator. They compared the results of 
simulations with the results from experiments with three adult starlings in random 
ratio and fixed ratio feeders. In both conditions, the feeder that gave the higher rate of 
food dropped rapidly to zero and the starlings decided to forage on the other one. The 
trend of switching to other feeder is cal led the drop to zero phenomena which, of the 
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models tested, only the dual-process mode! predicted it well. Results seem to be as 
expected from a partial reinforcement extinction effect that is the situation where an 
animal stops responding sooner to a less variable option than a more variable option, 
when both stop providing a reward. They did not however consider Bayesian 
approach either in the models or in the analysis. But they claimed that under some 
constraints Bayesian approaches may be more powerful than linear operator to 
describe the results. The Bayesian statistical approach is known as a competitor to 
linear operator based learning rules. To study the distinction between linear operator 
and statistical approaches, McNamara & Houston (1987) show how linear operator 
cornes from a statistical approach by choosing memory factor properly as a fonction 
of variance and mean in reward . 
Because information has a central role in learning, Stephens ( 1989) used an analytical 
approach to approximate the value of information. His results suggest that two factors 
are important in determining its value: first, the optimal behavior that would be 
chosen if the decision maker knew which subtype of the resource it faced; second, the 
cost of small deviations from the optimal behavior. He shows that the value of 
information is approximately equal to the product of the mean cost of smal 1 
deviations from the subtype optima and the variance of a modified distribution of the 
optimal behaviors . It is interesting to note that in this paper Stephens shows that a 
linear operator offers a greedy approach: maximization of immediate reward 
(Cormen, 2001 ). However, greedy algorithms are not necessarily optimal such that 
the linear operator could be suboptimal under some ecological conditions(Sutton & 
Barto, 1998). Linear operator, also known as the Rescorla-Wagner rule, was shown to 
be favored by natural selection in a simulation study (Trimmer et al. , 2012) and 
provides the basic structure for many more complicated forms of reinforcement 
learning rules (Sutton & Barto, 1998). 
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0.3.4 On the extent of matching 
It has long been claimed that an optimal decision maker must adopt alternative 
actions in proportion to their observed or estimated payoffs , cal led the matching ratio 
(matching law, law of effect) (Herrnstein , 1961 , 1970; Herrnstein & Heyman, 1979). 
Matching allows an individual to sample ail of the options, whit e sti ll exploiting the 
best option most often. This is in contrast to maximizing, where an individual 
exploits on ly the best option. Matching vs. maximizing have been frequently tested 
with both models (Lea & Dow, 1984; Lester, 1984; McNamara & Houston, 1985; 
Myerson & M iezin , 1980; Staddon, 1977; Tracy & Seaman, 1995) and experiments 
(Krebs et al. , 1978; Milinski , 1979; Plowright & Plowright, 1987). Severa! 
experiments and models have shown that in some condition matching is not an 
optimal behavior (Staddon, Hinson, & Kram, 1981) and an imais behave differently 
from matching (Herrnstein & Heyman, 1979). Houston (Harley, 1983 , 1987; 
Houston , 1983 ; Houston & Sumida, 1987) therefore was highly critical of the use of 
matching in Harley' s relative payoff sum. 
lnstead of pure matching or pure maximizing, other methods of balancing sampling 
and exploitation were also proposed. In the e-greedy strategy (Sutton & Barto, 1998), 
the decision maker samples ail options equally with probability e, and exploits the 
best known option with probability 1-e. When it enters a new envi ronment, it can 
have large e during the early trials allowing it to decay gradually. So, the decision-
maker samples more at the beginning of trials to gather a coarse estimation of the 
payoffs. Then as e moves closer to zero, it gradually fine tunes its knowledge. ln the 
failure strategy (Thuij sman, Peleg, Amitai , & Shmida, 1995), an an imal leaves option 
A after PA failed trials, and leave B after PB fa il ed trials. lt updates PA and PB with 
new experiences. When it selects a new option, it se lects each option relative to its p. 
Thuijsman et al. (1995) compared e-greedy and failure strategies along with linear 
operator in simulations of an ideal free distribution problem and the matching law in 
bees. They find that the optimal balance between sampling ( exploration)-exploitation 
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is sensitive to time horizon. The results show that bees in groups have a matching 
behavior that is optimal and successfully converge to the ideal free distribution. 
Matching behavior is however not optimal when they forage solitarily. 
0.4 Thesis overview 
The following chapters explore the hypothesis that in some contexts learning is as 
powerful as evolutionary models in predicting animal behavior: 
Chapter 1. A unified modelling approach for producer-scrounger games m 
complex ecological conditions 
Chapter li. Zebra finches scrounge more when patches vary m quality: 
Experimental support of the linear operator learning rule 
Chapter III. The evolution of learning and non-learning rules m dynamic 
environments: A test of the behavioural gambit 
Chapter rv. General discussion and future directions 
In chapter l, 1 propose an agent-based mode! using a linear operator learning rule as 
the decision mechanism for producer-scrounger game, a social foraging behavior that 
has been extensively studied in behavioral ecology. The mode! provides a unified 
framework from which to predict the effects on the expected equilibrium of producers 
and scroungers of group size, metabolic requirement, finder ' s advantage, food intake 
rate , cost of searching, cost of joining, patch encounter probability, and patch 
richness. 1 then compared the results of the mode! with previously published models, 
experiments, and observation. The simulation results replicate almost every producer-
scrounger prediction and experimental result published to date such that it provides a 
more general tool than any single game-theoretic model to predict behaviour under 
frequency-dependent conditions. The mode! furthermore allows us to develop a nove! 
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prediction about the behavior m a more rea li stic environment of vari able patch 
richness . 
In chapter II , 1 test Chapter I's navel prediction that increased patch quali ty variances 
calls fo r high equilibrium frequency of scrounging. In doing so, we used captive 
forag ing fl ocks of male zebra finches in two conditions with variable and non-
variable patch quality. The results show that as individuals ga in experience in the 
variable environment, they increase their scrounging behav ior. Thi s supports the 
prediction of the linear operator model, emphas izing the power of the learning ru le 
approach in studying animal behav ior. 
ln chapter lll , 1 explored the conditions under which a linear operator type of learning 
is expected to evolve in a frequency-dependent context like a producer-scrounger 
game. ln doing so, 1 addressed both limitations of earlier studies by putting fi xed 
against learning agents while exploring the effects of no fluctuations, as we ll as 
within or between-generation fluctuations. The results show that at least within the 
context of a producer-scrounger game, we can accept the behavioral gambit if we are 
only interested in the populati on level equilibrium in static enviro nment, because 
learning generates a combination of strategy use that corresponds exactl y to what 
would be expected fro m evolutionary model based on selection acting on geneti c 
alternat ives. The results however emphas ize that we need to consider learning if there 
is environmental changes or if we want to predict the behavior at ind ividual-level. 
Finally, chapter IV prov ides a general discuss ion of the earli er chapters and their 
relation to my original hypothesis. 1 identifi ed the key contributions of this thesis and 
di scussed the directions fo r future research. 
[Cette page a été laissée intentionnellement blanche] 
CHAPTERI 
A UNIFIED MODELLING APPROACH FOR PRODUCER-SCROUNGER 
GAMES IN COMPLEX ECOLOGICAL CONDITIONS 
Afshar, M., & Giraldeau, L.-A . (2014). A unified modelling approach for producer-
scrounger games in complex ecological conditions. Animal Behaviour, 96, 167- 176. 
doi : l 0.1016/j.anbehav.2014.07.022 
1.1 Abstract 
Animal decision making in frequency-dependent situations, where the payoff of an 
action depends on the actions of others, has gained prominence in behavioural 
ecology and in social foraging in particular. One such situation involves cases where 
an animal can search for a new resource (produce) or join what others have already 
found (scrounge). A number of game-theoretic models have been proposed to predict 
the equilibrium combination of producer and scrounger strategists based on the 
evolutionarily stable strategy. However, each game mode! can only handle a few 
environmental parameters at a time and none address the flexible use of tactics that 
allows individuals to respond quickly and adaptively to changes in payoffs. ln this 
study we propose an agent-based mode! using a linear operator learning rule as the 
decision mechanism. The mode! provides a unified framework from which to predict 
the effects on the expected equilibrium of producers and scroungers of group size, 
metabolic requirement, finder 's advantage, food intake rate, cost of searching, cost of 
joining, patch encounter probability and patch richness . The simulation results 
replicate almost every producer- scrounger prediction and experimental result 
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published to date such that the simulation provides a more general tool than any 
single game-theoretic mode! to predict behaviour under frequency-dependent 
conditions. The mode! furthermore allows us to develop a nove! prediction about 
foraging behaviour in a more realistic environment of variable patch richness. By 
modelling the operation of a plausible decision ru le, we can explore the validity of the 
behavioural gambit, the assumption that the unspecifted decision mechanisms of 
game-theoretic models faithfully reproduce outcomes expected of natural selection 
operating over generations on fixed alternatives. We suggest that this simulation 
mode! can provide a tool for others to explore and predict the effect of more complex 
and hence realistic foraging conditions on individual levels of producer and scrounger 
use. 
Keywords: decision making, evolutionary game theory, frequency-dependent 
selection, learning rule, producer- scrounger, risk sensitivity, social foraging 
1.2 Introduction 
Animais of the same spec1es sometimes use different tactics when engaged in 
foraging or mate choice (Da vies et al. , 2012). The choice of tactic is generally made 
as a fonction of state and or time, and the ru le that governs this choice is referred to as 
a strategy ( e.g. for the tactics of wander or defend, the strategy might be ' if young, 
wander; if old, defend '; Gross, 1996; Houston & McNamara, 2005; Tomkins & 
Hazel , 2007). Behavioural ecologists are interested in why different tactics coexist in 
the same population under the same ecological conditions. One possible explanation 
is that none of the tactics can reach fixation because their fitnesses are negatively 
correlated with their frequencies in the population : a negative frequency dependence 
that predicts stable mixtures of tactics (Barnard & Sibly, 1981 ; Beauchamp, Bélisle, 
& Giraldeau, 1997; Coolen, Giraldeau, & La voie, 2001 ; Giraldeau & Livoreil , 2000; 
Giraldeau, Soos, & Beauchamp, 1994; Maynard Smith, 1982; Morand-Ferron, 
Giraldeau, & Lefebvre, 2007; Mottley & Giraldeau, 2000; Wu & Giraldeau, 2005). 
23 
For more than three decades, evol utionary game theory has been the main too l used in 
frequency dependent situations to predict an equilibrium mixture of tactics based on 
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) theory. ESS theory assumes that strategies (and 
so the equilibrium mixture of tactics) are determined by natura l selection acting on 
genetic alte rn atives (Maynard Smith , 1982). lt can predict the equilibrium when there 
are either pure or mixed strategies in the population. A pure strategy is when each 
individual al ways uses either one tactic or the other, and so does not alternate 
between them (Gross, 1996). It can ari se because of geneti c diffe rences between 
individuals or environmental diffe rences (Da vies et al. , 20 12) or when the frequency 
of each strategy is set over generations by frequency-dependent se lecti on and the 
population then appears dimorphic (Bergstrom & Godfrey-Smith , 1998). A mixed 
strategy is when each individual plays a fi xed combination of diffe rent tactics so that 
the ESS is sati sfi ed by the overall combination of the population (G ross, 1996; 
Tomkins & Hazel, 2007). 
ESS theory only predi cts the distributions of tact ics. lt however remains si lent about 
the ways in which these di stributions are realized and makes no explicit prediction as 
to the di stribution of tactics in an infinite population accommodating anything from 
monomorphi sm, everyone uses the same mixture of tactics, to extreme 
polymorphi sm, where each individual adopts a unique combination of tactics 
(Bergstrom & Godfrey-Smith, 1998). Thi s leaves some important questi ons about 
how complex ity and di versity are rea lized within individuals and across a population. 
These questi ons have been addressed in Bergstrom and Godfrey-Smith (1998), 
Maynard Smith (1988) and Yickery (1987, 1988). ln a finite populati on, only pure 
strategies are expected from purely deterministic dynamics and no mixed strategy can 
be an ESS (Vickery, 1987, 1988). However, if the frequency of one pure strategist is 
low at ESS, stochastic environmental fluctuations may cause its extinction. ln thi s 
case, mixed strategies are favoured and can in vade the population (Bergstrom & 
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Godfrey-Smith, 1998; Maynard Smith, 1988; Orzack & Hines, 2005). Deterministic 
and stochastic methods can thus have different opposing predictions. 
ESS theory also accommodates situations where the fixed combination of each tactic 
is acquired by learning. ln this case it assumes that an evolutionary stable (ES) 
learning rule exists whose characteristics lead the population within a generation to 
the same equilibrium combination as would frequency-dependent selection over 
generations (Maynard Smith, 1982). lt is unclear whether a learned equilibrium 
should generate a monomorphic,·dimorphic or polymorphie population . Whatever the 
type of strategy expected at the ESS, be it pure, mixed or learned, the ESS theory 
approach in the context of animal behaviour suffers three important limitations that 
we consider in turn. 
The first is that, if selection is acting on genetic alternatives, individual behaviour 
must be genetically fixed. Yet, in many frequency dependent tasks, such as the 
producer-scrounger (PS) game, prisoner' s dilemma and ideal free distribution, 
behaviour does not appear genetically fixed but rather a learned ESS (Belmaker, 
Motro, Feldman , & Lotem, 2012; Lendvai , Barta, & Liker, 2004; Morand-Ferron & 
Giraldeau, 201 O; Morand-Ferron, Varennes, & Giraldeau, 2011 ; Morand-Ferron, Wu, 
& Giraldeau, 2011 ). Furthermore, man y behavioural games are probably played 
several times and under different conditions within a generation (Stephens & 
Clements, 1998). The optimality of any tactic thus changes during an individual's 
lifetime. Here, any genetically fixed mechanism may be handicapped to respond to 
the changes in the structure of the games. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the 
optimality of such a game would be fixed in merely a genetic mechanism during 
evolutionary timescale. The expectation that a learned ESS will always generate a 
combination of strategy use that corresponds to that expected from selection acting on 
genetic alternatives remains an untested assumption (Harley, 1981 ; Harley & 
Maynard Smith, 1983 ; Hines & Bishop, 1983 ; Maynard Smith, 1982; Tracy & 
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Seaman, 1995), and its acceptance, what Giraldeau and Dubois (2008) described as 
accepting the ' behavioural gambit ', may be incorrect (Fawcett et al., 2013; 
McNamara & Houston, 2009). 
The second limitation of the ESS approach is its inability to deal effective ly with 
complicated situations (Fawcett et al. , 2014). For example, the possibility that 
ecological conditions (the frequency-dependent nature of man y games and the 
specificities of the decision mechanism) may constrain the equilibrium that a 
population can be expected to reach is also largely ignored (Fawcett et al., 2013; 
Grodzinski , Dor, & Lotem, 2011 ; McNamara & Houston, 2009). Because of the 
analytical complexity of solving ESS models in more reali stic situations, most of 
these models consider conditions in which the organism is omniscient and the 
environment is oversimplified and often static. The predictions from these models 
then encourage experimentalists to test their predictions in equally simplistic and 
hence unrealistic conditions. This oversimplification of conditions in which 
frequency dependence is considered has been justly criticized for being too far 
removed from the world in which organisms have evolved (Fawcett et al. , 2014). 
Finally, behaviourists who wish to predict how individuals behave in a population 
cannot rely on ESS theory. This is because ESS theory only predicts the average 
stable mixtures of strategies across populations, not the tactic combination for each 
individual within a population. ESS theory remains silent concerning whether ail 
individuals should adopt the same proportion of each tactic (monomorphism), or 
whether some individuals should use higher proportions of one tactic white others use 
lower proportions (dimorphism). If we are to predict individual behaviour it would be 
important, therefore, to develop a way of predicting it in situations of frequency 
dependence that rely on learning. Such an approach should allow us to predict 
individual behaviour and explore the effects of more realistic environmental 
conditions not only on individual tactic use, but on its expected variation among 
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individuals within populations. A behavioural mechanism based on learning not only 
responds to a repeated game with changing conditions during an individual ' s lifetime 
(Stephens & Clements, L998), it can furthermore be used in multiple games affecting 
different equilibriums simultaneously. 
To this end, in this study we address the first and the second limitations of ESS 
theory by proposing a simulation mode! that predicts the same population equilibrium 
as an ESS. This mode! incorporates a commonly used learning rule as the 
individual ' s cognitive decision mechanism (Arbilly & Laland, 2014; Beauchamp et 
al., 1997; Beauchamp, 2000; Dridi & Lehmann, 2014; Dubois, Morand-Ferron, & 
Giraldeau, 201 O; Hamblin & Giraldeau, 2009; Katsnelson , Motro, Feldman, & 
Lotem, 2012; Kurvers, Hamblin, & Giraldeau, 2012). We then tackle the second 
limitation by adding complexity to the environment beyond what has been possible 
with game-theoretic PS models and the experimental studies they generated. We use 
the mode! to bring a novel prediction about the expected effect of patch quality 
variance on the equilibrium use of search and join tactics . 
ln our simulation we assume that agents use their experience of payoffs to decide on 
the tactic they adopt: we assume learning. We acknowledge that the evolution and use 
of learning in the context of such frequency-dependent games is not straightforward. 
For instance, Dubois et al. (2010) showed that although learning individuals 
experience an initial advantage in a producer-scrounger game, they never evolve to 
fixation. The population is th us made up of a mixture of fixed and flexible (learning) 
players. Moreover, by explicitly modelling learning in a producer-scrounger game, 
Katsnelson et al. (2012) showed that learning can evolve to fixation but only when 
there is sufficient environmental fluctuations or when there is asymmetry in 
individual's phenotype. Notwithstanding these difficulties concerning the origins of 
learning in groups, we choose to assume that our agents used learning rules to decide 
on tactic use, an assumption that is supported by a number of empirical studies. 
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Learning rul es, for instance, have been used in psychology, ethology and behav ioural 
eco logy fo r many years to mode! animal behav iour individually or in gro ups (Arbilly 
& Laland, 2014 ; Bush & Mosteller, 195 1a; Dridi & Lehmann, 20 14; Estes, 1950; 
Hamblin & Giraldeau, 2009; Harley, 1981 ; Herrnste in, 196 1; Krebs et al. , 1978 ; 
McNamara & Houston, 1985 ; Stephens, 1989). Moreover, in a seri es of producer-
scrounger experiments with nutmeg mannikins, Lonchura punctulata, Morand- Ferron 
and Giraldeau (2010) fo und that the group-l evel proporti on of the join tacti c adjusts 
to different environmental conditions by learning the payoffs associated with each 
tacti c. Birds trained in a low-scrounging condition joined less than those tra ined in a 
high-scrounging condition and continued to do so even when subsequently tested in 
the same co nditions. Similarly, by direct manipulation of the success rate experienced 
by adult ho use sparrows, Passer domesticus, Belmaker et al. (201 2) cou Id change the 
birds' subsequent strategy choice. Birds more frequentl y used the strategy with which 
they we re more successful , and the differences in tacti c use were correlated with 
diffe rences in success rate. 
The learning rule approach, coupled with an agent-based simulation, could specify 
more clearl y the sensitivity and the attributes of the equilibri a to the animal decision 
making mechani sm. ln thi s case, the populati on equilibrium cornes from the 
interactions of individuals with each other and with the environment at an ecological 
timescale rather than from the action of natural se lecti on over generations. 
Furthermore, it is now poss ible to study the behaviour of each animal individually, 
and ask, for instance, how the parameters of the learning rule ( e.g. its memory 
window, sampling frequency) and the decision rule (matching versus max imizing) 
influence not onl y the equilibrium but the extent of individual variation in strategy 
use at equil ibrium. 
We use an agent-based simulation mode! operating in a PS game context fo r which 
there already exists a number of published models and empirical results. This allows 
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us to test the validity of our simulation by companng its results against the 
predictions of several publi shed PS models as well as the results reported from a 
number of experimental studies. Our simulation model uses a linear operator (LO) 
learning rule, the most commonly used learning rule in behavioural ecology. The LO 
is simple and has fewer parameters compared with alternative learning rules (e .g. 
relative payoff sum: Harley, 1981 ; perfect memory: Houston & Sumida, 1987). 
Linear operator, also known as the Rescorla-Wagner rule, was shown to be favoured 
by natural selection in a simulation study (Trimmer et al. , 2012) and provides the 
basic structure for many more complicated forms of reinforcement learning rules 
(Sutton & Barto, 1998). LO has been previously used in the PS game in competition 
with other learning rules (Beauchamp, 2000a; Hamblin & Giraldeau, 2009), alone 
(Arbilly, Motro, Feldman, & Lotem, 2010) and with nonlearning strategies (Arbilly 
& Laland, 2014; Katsnelson et al. , 2012). The interest of these earlier studies on 
learning rules resided in the evolution of the learning rule itself and in determining 
the performance of the rules in reaching an equilibrium, namely their evolutionary 
stability. Here, instead, we simply assume the LO is the stable learning rule and use it 
to explore the expected effects of a number of different ecological parameters on the 
equilibrium of expressed tactics in a PS game. 
1.3 Producer-scrounger game 
When foraging in a group, an individual can obtain food by searching for a new food 
patch or by joining patches already found by others (Barnard & Sibly, 1981 ). In some 
cases, such as some ground-feeding birds, the two alternatives are temporally 
incompatible because the animal cannot look at the ground to search for food (head 
down) and watch others in the group to join them when they find food (head up) 
simultaneously (Cool en et al. , 2001 ). Individuals may adopt pure strategies, a 
situation where they use only one tactic: either search only (pure producer) or join 
only (pure scrounger). They can have different combinations of search and join 
tactics. Thus, to be more accurate, we define a 'producer' more broadly as an 
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individual that searches more . than it joins, and a ' scrounger' as an individual that 
joins more than it searches. This means there is variation in the search- join 
combination within this broadly defined producer, so a ' producer ' does not represent 
a single strategy but a continuum of unique strategies with different proportions of 
join tactic. The same ho Ids for the ' scrounger' . ESS theory predicts a specific 
evolutionary stable frequency of join where the payoffs of both search and join tactics 
are equal (Giraldeau & Beauchamp, 1999). The general question in a producer-
scrounger game is to find this equilibrium and explain how changes in environmental 
parameters affect it. 
1.4 Linear operator mode! 
In this mode! of social foraging, a given group of individuals forages in a virtual 
environment, represented by a matrix. Each individual is a separate learner and tries 
to maximize the amount of food gained: its payoff. It uses a linear operator learning 
rule to estimate the value of each tactic (search or join) by the following equation: 
Vi(t) = Vi(t - 1) + x (Pi(t) - Vi(t - 1)), Vi(O) = unif(o,1) where Vi(t) and Pi(t) are the 
estimated value and the observed payoff, respectively, for tactic i at time t. x is the 
learning rate (1 - x is the memory factor). The first term, Vi(t - 1), is the previous 
estimation, and the second term, Pi(t) - Vi(t - 1), is the difference between the 
observed payoff and the previous estimated value. This process updates the estimated 
value of the most recent tactic. For the ôther tactic that has not been sampled at time 
t , the estimated value remains unchanged (Vi(t) = Vi(t - 1)). Vi(o) is the initial 
condition, which is chosen at random from a uniform distribution between zero and 
one. This causes the average initial preference of the population to be 50% for the 
search tactic and 50% for the join tactic. 
So, in the linear operator, with each new expenence, the estimated value moves 
towards the recent observed payoff by a rate of x. At each time step, the learner 
decides which of the two tactics to express by adopting alternative tactics in 
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proportion to their estimated values, called matching ratio. This choice mechanism 
allows the individual to sample both tactics, while still exploiting the best one 
proportionally more often. 
ln the simulation model , time is divided into discrete steps. Each time step can be 
interpreted as one sampling event in the real world. ln each time step, an individual 
adopts a tactic. If it searches, then whether it encounters a patch or not depends on the 
patch encounter probability. Simultaneous discoveries by different individuals are 
possible when they concurrently use the search tactic. lndividuals that join, see the 
location of ail discovered patches and they join the nearest patch. The patch may be 
depleted just before the individual arrives because of other individuals already present 
at the patch. 
Upon encountering a food patch, the finder receives a fraction of the food in the 
patch: the finder's advantage. This represents the amount of food the finder would be 
able to eat before the joiners arrive. ln subsequent time steps, ail individuals at the 
patch, the finder and those that have joined, receive food at the same food intake rate. 
Normally, due to competition, the rate of food intake is affected by the number of 
scroungers at the patch, but for simplicity, we kept intake rate fixed . The individuals 
at the patch continue eating until the patch is depleted , at which point each individual 
chooses a tactic using the LO. We assume that in each time step individuals require a 
minimum amount of energy to survive, a parameter we termed metabolic 
requirement. If an individual does not meet its metabolic requirement, it survives but 
gets a negative payoff to ensure that there is value in exploiting the better tactic more 
often. ln the literature, terms such as energy reserve or energy requirement (Koops & 
Giraldeau, 1996; Lendvai et al. , 2004; Wu & Giraldeau, 2005) have also been used 
for the same concept. We however use metabolic requirement as it is well defined and 
easier to understand. lndividuals must also pay a cost of searching or joining. These 
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costs are abso lute values and are incurred in each time step, depending on the tactic 
played. 
Each simulati on invo lves 500 time steps. Because of the learning mechani sm and the 
random initial condition, the proportion of individuals using the join tacti c changes 
rapidly at the beginning of each simulati on, then graduall y converges to a stable 
point. To determine the predicted combination of tactics, we consider onl y the second 
half of the simulation , when values have stabilized. 
The general parameter settings fo r ail simulations are shown in Table 1.1. We chose 
parameter va lues to be as similar as poss ible to empirical simulation and modelling 
studies to which they will be related. The range of parameters was chosen to allow 
max imum exploration of their effect white keeping the simulation computationall y 
poss ible. To study the effect of an ecological parameter on the expected PS 
equilibrium, we conducted a set of 30 simulations fo r each va lue of that parameter, 
while ail the other general parameters remained unchanged. Thus, the results are 
averaged over the 30 simulations. Ali simulations were conducted in MatLab 
(R20 l 3a) for Windows (Mathworks, Nati ck, MA, U.S.A.). 
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Table 1.1 Parameter settings for the linear operator model in the producer-
scrounger game. 
Parameter Symbol Value 
Grid size G )5 X 15 
Maximum simulation time step Tmax 500 
Group size N 8 
Metabolic requirement CMR 0.1 25 
Finder's advantage a 2.5 
Food intake rate b 
Cost of searching Csearch 0.1 25 
Cost of joining Cjoin 0.125 
Patch encounter probability p 0.2 
Patch richness (mean) µp 20 
Learning rate x 0.3 
Range 
5-50 
0-2 
1-20 
0.5-2 .5 
0-2 
0-2 
0.1-1 
5-35 
To see the effect of each parameter, we kept ail parameters equal to their values and changed 
only one parameter at a time based on the mentioned range. 
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To test the simulation results with published predictions and observati ons, we 
co llected predi ctions fro m publ ished models and empi rica l resul ts for PS games by 
conducting a literature search using the Scopus bibliographie database. We searched 
fo r ' producer scrounger' , without quotation marks and as two separate words, in the 
article titl e, abstract and keyword fi elds for papers published in and befo re 201 3. We 
located 121 publicati ons, of which we exc luded three because they were not Engli sh 
and two because they were dupli cate entries. Another 29 papers were excluded 
because they used the concept of ' producer scrounger' in other domai ns, such as 
group search optimizers in computer sc ience, and did not prov ide resul ts in the area 
of fo raging behav iour. We expanded our search by fo llowing up the reference 
sections of these papers, which prov ided an additional 11 publicati ons that had not 
appeared in our ori ginal Scopus search. ln the end , we used the models or 
experimental results reported in 98 publications. 
We chose to explore the effect of the fo ll owing eight eco logical parameters on the 
expected equilibrium mixture of tacti cs: group size, metaboli c requirement, finder's 
advantage (the amount of food fro m a patch that goes to the exc lusive use of the 
find er), food intake rate, cost of searchin g, cost of joining, patch encounter 
probabili ty and patch richness. 
1.4. 1 Results 
Our resul ts show that an individual's proportion of join tactic (its strategy) changes 
over time and so responds to its experi ence of the environment (F igure 1.1 ). Although 
each indi vidual changes its use of joining tacti c, it seems to respond idiosyncratica ll y 
to its own experience. If one considers onl y the last half of the simulat ion, when the 
use of tactics by the group is most likely to have reached an equilibrium, we can 
observe that an individual' s final strategy is often not pure; individuals obta in their 
food fro m a combination of both finding and joining. This means that the expected 
34 
equilibrium state of the population is highly polymorphie, with each individual 
adopting a distinct combination of finding and joining. Furthermore, the result shows 
that the average of the population does converge towards an unchanging value, 
consistent with an equilibrium. However, individuals that try to maximize their own 
payoff by choosing the better tactic based on their experience do not converge to this 
mean and continue to change their strategy over time. Instead, the population is 
strongly polymorphie in its use of the alternative foraging tactics. 
The simulation predicts that the equilibrium level of joining changes in response to 
each of the eight parameters we explored (Figure 1.2). lt is noteworthy that the 
weakest effects are expected for group size, metabolic requirement and food intake 
rate. The parameters that exert the strongest effects are patch encounter probability, 
patch richness and the finder ' s advantage. 
These simulation results match the predictions of published game-theoretic models as 
well as ail but two published empirical results (Table 1.2). One of the mismatches 
concerns the effect of energy reserves or metabolic requirement. ln this case, the 
empirical results reported by Lendvai et al. (2004) are opposite to those expected by 
our simulation. The other mismatch concerns the observation by Koops and 
Giraldeau ( 1996) that joining declines with declining likelihood of patch encounter, a 
result that also contradicts the results of Beauchamp and Giraldeau's ( 1996) 
simulation model. 
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o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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Time step 
Figure 1.1 Evidence of temporal adjustment of the producer-scrounger 
strategy for a sample group of eight individuals engaged in choosing tactics 
using a linear operator learning rule. Each line shows the proportion of join 
tactic choices for one individual. The thick dashed line shows the average for the 
group. This shows, that by the end of the simulation, individuals do not 
necessarily adopt a pure strategy (ail find, or ail search), which means that, in 
terms of expressed tactics, the population ends in a strong polymorphism of 
tactics. 
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Figure 1.2 Proportion of join tactic at equilibrium as a fonction of changes in 
eight ecological parameters (group size, metabolic requirement, finder's advantage, 
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food intake rate, cost of searching, cost of joining, patch encounter probability and 
patch richness) for group of eight individuals while foraging in a producer-scrounger 
game and choosing tactics based on a Iinear operator learning rule. Means ± SD are 
shown (N=30). The general parameter settings for ail simulations are shown in Table 
1.1. 
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Table 1.2 Comparison of the predictions made by the Linear Operator 
agent-based simulation model with predictions of previous models and results 
obtained from experiments. Only studies that provided predictions or results 
concerning the parameters that we investigated were considered. 
Parameter 
Reference (M: model, E: experiment): Effect 
Group size 
Caraco & Giraldeau (1991; M) : Larger group size, more scroungers 
Vickery et al. (1991; M): Larger group size, more scroungers 
Beauchamp & Giraldeau (1996; M) : Larger group size, more scroungers 
Coolen (2002; E) : Larger group size, more scroungers 
Metabolic requirement 
Koops & Giraldeau (1996; E): Higher energy requirement (lower energy reserve), 
no significant effect on scrounging 
Lendvai et al. (2004; E) : Higher energy requirement (lower energy reserve), more 
scroungers 
Wu & Giraldeau (2005; E) : Higher energy requirement (lower energy reserve), 
smal 1 non-significant effect of fewer scrounging 
Finder's advantage 
Caraco & Giraldeau (1991; M) : Larger finder's share, fewer scroungers 
Vickery et al. (1991; M) : Larger finder 's share, fewer scroungers 
Giraldeau & Livoreil (2000; E): Larger finder's share, fewer scroungers 
Hamilton (2002; M) : Larger ownership advantage, fewer scroungers 
Food intake rate 
Caraco & Giraldeau (1991; M) : Higher food intake, less scroungers (ifprobability 
offinding food by producing is high. Otherwise no change in scroungers) 
Cost of searching (cost of tinding food by producing) 
Giraldeau et al. (1994; E) : Higher cost of producing, more scroungers 
Kameda & Nakanishi (2002; M+E): Lower cost of searching, fewer scroungers 
Morand-Ferron et al. (2007; E) : Higher cost of producing, more scroungers 
Cost of joining (cost offinding food by scrounging) 
Caraco & Giraldeau (1991; M) : Higher cost ofscrounging, fewer scroungers 
Morand-Ferron et al. (2007; E): Higher cost of scrounging, fewer scroungers 
Patch encounter probability (probability of finding food by producing) 
Koops & Giraldeau (1996; E) : Lower probability offinding food by producing, 
Predicted 
qualitatively by 
simulation 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
fewer scroungers 
Beauchamp & Giraldeau (1996; M) : Higher probability of patch encounter, fewer 
scroungers 
Hamilton (2002; M): Higher rate offinding food, fewer scroungers 
Barrette & Giraldeau (2006, E) : Cryptic food (more di ffic ult to find ), more 
scroungers 
Beauchamp (2008, M) : Lower probability offinding food by producing, more 
scroun ers 
Patch richness (average number of seeds in each patch) 
Vickery et al. ( 1991; M) : Larger patch richness, more scroungers 
Beauchamp & Giraldeau (1996; M): Larger patch ri chness, more scroungers 
Beauchamp (2008, M) : Larger patch richness, more scroungers 
"" 
"" 
"" 
"" 
"" 
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1.5 The effect of variable patch quality onjoining 
None of the models that have been generated so far consider the potential effect of 
variance in patch quality on the use of PS alternatives. Ali published accounts of PS 
games, whether simulations or experimental tests, have involved collections of 
identical food patches. This is surprising given that, in the field , foragers probably 
encounter foraging patches of various richness. Our simulation mode! however 
allows us to address whether adding variance in patch richness has repercussions on 
the equilibrium proportion of joining. 
To analyse the effect of patch richness variance on the expected frequency of the join 
tactic, we extended the LO mode! by adding variance to the patch richness. This 
allowed the patches to contain different quantities of food. We used the same 
parameter settings as the value in Table 1.1 with the exception of patch richness mean 
( µF) and patch richness standard deviation (crF). We studied the effect of crF for three 
habitats with different mean patch richness, µF = 5, 10 and 15. For each µF , we 
varied patch quality variance by altering the standard deviations of patch qualities and 
changing crF from 0 to µF. A set of 30 simulations was conducted for each 
combination of crF and µF , and the results averaged over the 30 simulations. 
1.5.1 Results 
The simulated individuals rapidly changed their use of the join tactic at the beginning 
of each simulation because of the learning mechanism and the random initial 
condition (Figure 1.3). The level of joining then gradually converged to a stable 
point. To determine the predicted combination of tactics, we used only the second 
half of the simulation, when the values had stabilized. 
Similar to previous models (Beauchamp, 2008 ; Beauchamp & Giraldeau, 1996; 
Yickery et al. , 1991 ), the results of our simulation (Figure 1.4) showed that a higher 
mean patch richness (µF) predicts a higher proportion of joining. However, our mode! 
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goes fu rther because fo r each µF , increasing the vari ance of patch richness a F also 
increases the proportion of joining within the populati on. Thi s is an enti re ly new 
predicti on that no earlier model or empirical study has yet explored . Moreover, as 
° F / µF increases, the average proportion of the join tact ic fo r diffe rent µF values 
converge. This means that the effect of patch richness vari ance shoul d decrease as the 
mean patch ri chness of a habitat increases. 
The proportion of joining was hi gher when the variance of patch ri chness was higher 
(F igure 1.3). Because the ini tial condi tion (Vi(O)) was set randoml y, both conditions 
started at a 50% joining proportion (F igure 1.3). The difference in the proportion of 
joining between conditions was therefore small initially and then increased with more 
experi ence until it stabilized and remained so unt il the end of the simulations (time 
step = 500). Both conditions caused individuals to decrease their use of joining below 
the initial 50%, but the decline was more pronounced when the variance of patch 
richness was lower (F igure 1.3). 
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Effect of patch richness (mean and variance) on the proportion of join 
tactic. Means ± SD are shown (N = 30). To compare the results for different µF, we show 
the results based on the patch richness coefficient variance (O'F / µF). 
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1 .6 Discussion 
The agent-based simulation we provide here represents a realistic and effective tool to 
predict producer- scrounger behaviour under a number of different foraging 
situations. The model is trustworthy to the extent that it has succeeded in duplicating, 
at least qualitatively, almost every prediction made by different published producer-
scrounger models. lt is worth noting that no single game-theoretic PS model 
published to date is capable of making ail of our model's predictions. So, this 
simulation model predicts PS behaviour under a greater range of situations than any 
single game-theoretic PS model. 
We noted two instances where predictions of our simulation model did not match 
published observations. One of these refers to the effect of energy requirement on the 
observed level of joining. The effect of metabolic requirement on a PS game has been 
studied in laboratory flocks of European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris (Koops & 
Giraldeau, 1996), nutmeg mannikins (Wu & Giraldeau, 2005) and house sparrows 
(Lendvai et al ., 2004). Lendvai et al. (2004) reported that lower energy reserves 
increased the use of joining during the first feed of the day. Koops and Giraldeau 
( 1996) and Wu and Giraldeau (2005) however found small (nonsignificant) effects on 
the proportion of join tactic, which were similar to the nonsignificant effects (SD 
intervals overlaps for ail values of metabolic requirement in Figure 1.2) that we 
observed from the LO model. The significant effect observed in Lendvai et al. (2004) 
might be because it was limited only to the first feed of the day and the birds were not 
allowed to adapt to food deprivation. 
The other instance where our simulation model diverged from observation concerned 
Koops and Giraldeau's (1996) report that the expected level of joining declines when 
the probability of finding food declines. Our simulation instead predicted (Figure 1.2) 
that the proportion of join tactic should increase when the probability of finding food 
declines. This prediction is compatible with the predictions of Beauchamp and 
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Giraldeau ( 1996), Hamilton (2002), Beauchamp (2008), and an empirical study with 
nutmeg mannikins reported by Barrette and Giraldeau (2006) . Koops & Giraldeau 
argued that, based on variance-sensitive game-theoretic models (Caraco & Giraldeau, 
1991), when the probability of encountering a patch by search increases, the intake 
for ail foragers will increase in a given foraging period. Consequently, individuals 
that are variance averse should reduce their use of the variance-prone search tactic 
and increase their use of variance-averse join tactic. This interpretation, however, 
depends on the costs of searching and joining. If the cost of joining is high relative to 
the cost of searching, say because animais must appropriate the resource aggressively, 
then the search tactic is less variance prone when the probability of patch encounter is 
higher. An extreme example of this would be if patch encounter probability was 1, 
such that individuals find instantaneously upon choosing to search, making joining a 
totally unnecessary and hence irrational option, especially if joining is more costly 
than searching. Defendable, indivisible and very poor food patches are ail examples 
where increasing patch encounter probability increases the payoff for the search tactic 
but not for the join tactic. 
Unlike game-theoretic models, our simulation predicts explicitly that foragers are 
unlikely to specialize in only searching or joining and hence that populations should 
appear polymorphie in terms of tactic use. Most published accounts of individual use 
of tactics are compatible with our model 's expectation (Barnard & Sibly, 1981; 
Beauchamp, 2001 ; Bicca-Marques & Garber, 2005 ; Coolen, 2002; Coolen et al. , 
2001 ; Giraldeau, Hogan, & Clinchy, 1990; Ha & Ha, 2003 ; llan , Katsnelson, Motro, 
Feldman, & Lotem, 2013; Koops & Giraldeau, 1996; Mathot & Giraldeau, 2008; 
M6nus & Barta, 2008; Morand-Ferron, Varennes, et al. , 2011; Morand-Ferron, Wu, 
et al. , 2011 ). ln a series of experiments with house sparrows, Barnard and Sibly 
(1981) reported that producers obtained 19.8- 38.3% oftheir food by joining and that 
scroungers obtained 38.5-48.8% of their food by searching. As Barnard and Sibly 
( 1981) emphasized, the flexible use of tactics allows individuals to respond quickly 
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and adaptively to changes in payoffs . The only published instance of pure tactic use 
was from a study that placed animais in situations that constrained them to specialize 
(Mottley & Giraldeau, 2000). 
ln the context of the producer- scrounger game, producing is a more uncertain 
foraging strategy than scrounging (Wu & Giraldeau, 2005). Producers rely on their 
own effort and the patch richness variance directly affects their performance (Rita & 
Ranta, 1998). However, as has been shown in Koops and Giraldeau (1996) and 
Lendvai et al. (2004) , scrounging is a variance-averse strategy. By exploiting the 
effort of multiple individuals, scrounging is more resistant to changes in patch 
richness variance and, therefore, is only affected by the average patch richness (Flynn 
& Giraldeau, 2001 ). The stable solution in a more uncertain environment is therefore 
to scrounge more (Lendvai et al ., 2004; Rita & Ranta, 1998). However, this is true 
only if the average patch richness is large enough to provide the minimum amount of 
energy required by each individual. Based on the shortfall minimizing mode! of 
variance-sensitive foraging theory, if average food intake is less than the minimum 
survival requirement, individuals might favour the variance-prone strategy since it 
offers at least a chance of survival (McNamara & Houston, 1992; Stephens & Krebs, 
1986). 
1.7 Future directions 
An important limitation of analytical evolutionary approaches (including ESS theory) 
is the excessive simplification of individuals and the environment in order to 
determine an expected stable outcome (Fawcett et al ., 2014). This is notas true for 
agent-based simulations, making it a particularly powerful means of exploring the 
expected outcomes for more complex and hence realistic conditions. Our results 
demonstrate that the simulation approach is entirely capable of replicating results 
obtained from highly simplified conditions. This is reassuring and suggests that it can 
provide a valuable basis for generating predictions in more complex situations. We 
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used the model to predict foraging behaviour when patches were of variable quality. 
Here, we explore some of the more likely situations where the simulation should be 
used to generate testable predictions for future enquiry. 
Based on previous studies (Belmaker et al. , 2012 ; Morand-Ferron & Giraldeau, 201 O; 
Stephens, 1991 ), we assumed that learning can evolve and fix in the population. For 
simplicity, we used the model to predict foraging behaviour when patches were of 
variable richness but the environment was not changing and individuals were 
identical. Katsnelson et al. (2012), however, showed that learning is more likely to 
evolve when there is asymmetry in phenotype and environmental fluctuation. lt will 
th us be important to verify the mode! and reanalyse the effect of these parameters on 
PS behaviour when phenotypic asymmetry or environmental fluctuations exist. Real-
life individuals are rarely identical. For instance, Mathot et al. (2009) reported that 
individuals differ in their basal metabolic rates (BMR) and that their preferences for 
the search or join tactic depends on their BMR; high BMR individuals join more. 
Severa( other studies also investigated the effect of individual differences in PS 
games (Barta & Giraldeau, 1998; Hamilton, 2002; Jolies, Ostojié, & Clayton, 2013 ; 
Marchetti & Drent, 2000; Mathot & Giraldeau, 201 O; McCormack, Jablonski , & 
Brown, 2007; Morand-Ferron, Varennes, et al. , 2011 ; Morand-Ferron, Wu, et al. , 
2011 ; Rita, Ran ta, & Peuhkuri , 1997). For instance, individuals within groups occupy 
different spatial positions, and simulation and experimental studies have 
demonstrated that spatial position affects an individual ' s preferred tactic (Barta, 
Flynn, & Giraldeau, 1997; Flynn & Giraldeau, 2001 ; King, Isaac, & · Cowlishaw, 
2009; M6nus & Barta, 2008). A number of recent studies have shown considerable 
individual differences in the speed of learning or in the propensity to learn 
(Katsnelson et al. , 2012), but we have little idea concerning how variation in learning 
affects tactic use and the extent of tactic polymorphism within a group. Furthermore, 
individuals show differences in their impulsiveness or exploratory tendencies as well 
as a whole slew of other behaviours that have been considered under the theme of 
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animal personalities (Réale & Dingemanse, 2012). What consequences might 
individual differences have on PS outcomes (Dubois, Giraldeau, & Réale, 2012)? 
These are ail examples where the agent-based linear operator model , unlike 
evolutionary game-theoretic models , can be used to explore the consequences for 
social foraging. In addition to explore the effect of individual differences, we suggest 
that the agent-based simulation cou Id be used to explore the effects of more complex 
environments. Examples include, but are not limited to, predation risk, patch defense 
and group size. One could also address the effect of PS behaviour on expected group 
s1ze. 
The simulation predicted that the equilibrium level of joining varied in response to 
each of the eight parameters we explored (Figure 1 .2). For example, group size, 
metabolic requirement and food intake rate had the weakest effects, while patch 
encounter probability, patch richness and the finder 's advantage exerted the strongest 
effects. An additional step, not yet taken , would be a detailed experimental 
examination of such differences. Knowing why some parameters have stronger 
effects may lead to a better understanding of animal behaviour and decision making 
in frequency-dependent tasks. We cannot however relate the slope of increase from 
our simulation results to real life experiments as we cannot relate the time steps in the 
simulation to seconds, minutes or trials in the real world. We thus need to verify and 
measure the effects experimentally. Then, we can compare the effects of different 
parameters and study why some effects are stronger than others. 
ln conclusion, we argue that learning rule models like the one we present here are 
more effective tools, in term of generality, to study and predict behaviour under 
frequency-dependent conditions. We mode! the decision rule as a mechanism to 
determine foraging behaviour directly and explicitly as suggested by Arbilly et al. 
(2010) and Grodzinski et al. (2011). The approach allows us to explore behaviour 
without indulging in a behavioural gambit, but the correspondence between 
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predictions from our model and those of game-theoretic models prov ide some 
reassurance that the gambit may be acceptable. Ultimately, however, the va lidity of 
the gambit needs to be established experimentally. Our laboratory is already engaged 
in exploring some of these effects, particularly the effect of patch variance on the use 
of the joining tact ic. We encourage other researchers to use our approach to extend 
PS games to a greater range of diverse, complex and hence more reali stic fo raging 
situations. 
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CHAPTER II 
ZEBRA FINCHES SCROUNGE MORE WHEN PATCHES VARY IN QUALITY: 
EXPERIM ENTAL SUPPORT OF THE LIN EAR OPERATOR LEA RNING RULE 
Afshar, M., Caro lyn L. Hall , & Giraldeau, L.-A. (20 14 ). Zebra finches scrounge more 
when patches vary in quality: Experimental support of linear operator learning rule. 
Animal Behaviour, 105, 2015 , 181-186. doi: I0 .101 6/j.anbehav .201 5.04.01 6 
2. 1 Abstract 
The use of evolutionary game theory and the concept of the evo lutionarily stable 
strategy (ESS) have corne under crit ic ism lately because game-theoretic models are 
often constra ined to overly simpl ist ic situati ons. Furthermore, game-theoretic models 
commit the behav ioural gambit, that is, they assume that individuals have some 
unspecified decision mechanism that dupli cates the outcomes that would be expected 
from natural se lection acting on genetic alternati ves. The producer- scrounger game is 
an ideal illustrat ion of the critic isms aimed at the game-theoretic approach; it has 
generated a number of game-theoretic models that make specific predictions fo r 
highly simplified fo raging conditions. Simulation rnodels of the producer-scrounger 
game that incorporate the linear operator learning rul e, however, have been more 
successful in replicating the empirical resul ts. In these models, groups of animais 
fo rage fo r patches of food using a linear operator learning rul e. The linear operator 
model furthermore prov ides a new prediction about the effect of variation in patch 
quality within a producer-scro unger game. Current models based on evo lutionarily 
stable strategies and empirical invest igations have always assumed or used patches of 
52 
uniform quality. Yet patches vary in quality and some environments are potentially 
more variable than others . The linear operator mode! predicts an increase in 
scrounging behaviour when patch quality varies. We tested this prediction using 
captive foraging flocks of male zebra finches, Taeniopygia guttata, in two treatments 
with variable and nonvariable patch quality. The results show that as individuals have 
more experience in the variable environment, they increase their scrounging 
behaviour. Linear operator models may therefore provide a general and empirically 
valid means of exploring the outcome of animal decisions in social foraging 
situations too complex to be addressed by evolutionary game models. 
Keywords: decision making, evolutionary game theory, frequency-dependent 
selection, learning rule, linear operator, producer- scrounger, risk sensitivity, social 
foraging, zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata) 
2.2 Introduction 
Situations where the outcome of an individual 's behaviour depends on the behaviour 
used by others commonly cal! for evolutionary game theory as an analytical tool 
(Giraldeau & Caraco, 2000; Maynard Smith, 1982). The use of evolutionary game 
theory and the concept of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), however, have 
corne under criticism because game-theoretic models are often constrained to overly 
simplistic situations that bear little resemblance to actual conditions under which the 
behavioural decision has evolved (Afshar & Giraldeau, 2014; Fawcett et al. , 2014; 
Grodzinski et al. , 2011). As a result, tests of these models ' predictions are often 
conducted under equally unrealistic and oversimplified situations. 
Another critique of evolutionary game theory, and of optimality in general, has been 
that it assumes the operation within individuals of some unspecified decision 
mechanism that duplicates the outcomes that would be expected from natural 
selection acting on genetic alternatives. lt therefore commits the behavioural gambit 
by assuming that psychological mechanisms do not constrain the behavioural 
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phenotypes that can evolve (Fawcett et al., 2013; Giraldeau & Dubois, 2008; 
McNamara & Houston, 2009). Severa( authors have thus argued that it would be 
more useful to explore the outcomes of decision mechanisms in game situations 
directly, rather than assume their operation and outcome (Arbilly et al. , 2011; Fawcett 
et al. , 2013; Katsnelson et al., 2012). 
In a recent study, Afshar and Giraldeau (2014) developed a simulation model that 
explored the outcomes of groups of individuals using an explicit learning rule in a 
producer-scrounger (PS) game (Barnard & Sibly, 1981 ). ln a PS game, individuals 
can obtain food by searching for a new food patch (producing) or by joining patches 
already found by others (scrounging). The game assumes that these two foraging 
alternatives are temporally incompatible, as is the case for animais like ground-
feeding birds (Cool en et al., 2001 ). When the scrounger strategy is rare, it receives a 
higher payoff than the producer tactic. lncreas ing the frequency of scrounging, 
however, decreases everyone's payoffs. The payoff for both alternatives is therefore 
affected by the frequency of the scrounger strategy. ESS game-theoretic models 
predict a specific evolutionarily stable frequency of scrounging where the payoffs of 
both alternatives are equal (Giraldeau & Beauchamp, 1999). The principal question, 
therefore, in PS research has been to explore how environmental and individual state 
parameters affect this equilibrium. The PS game is an ideal illustration of the 
criticisms aimed at the game-theoretic approach; it has generated a number of game-
theoretic models that make specific predictions for highly simplified foraging 
conditions (Afshar & Giraldeau, 2014). ln Afshar and Giraldeau (2014), the 
individual chooses which tactic to express based on the matching ratio , adopting the 
tactics in proportion to their estimated values, at each time step. This agent-based 
simulation was remarkably successful in replicating almost every published 
prediction and experimental result concerning PS games (Afshar & Giraldeau, 2014). 
Given the success of their simulation, they argued that the explicit decision model 
was a more effective means of predicting the effect of environmental factors on PS 
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behaviour than ESS models. They backed this claim by generating an entirely nove! 
prediction for a situation that was too complex for the outcome to be anticipated 
using a conventional ESS approach. Every previous ESS mode! and test of PS 
behaviour had considered only environments of homogeneous patch quality; ignoring 
the effect that a mixture of patch qualities would have on PS behaviour. The Afshar 
and Giraldeau (2014) simulation mode! showed, however, that the variance in patch 
quality should affect the expected level of scrounging, and it predicted that increasing 
variance should lead to increased scrounging. Furthermore, the simulation mode! 
showed that, because individuals use learning and hence their experience to adjust 
their behaviour, any changes in the amount of scrounging is expected to happen 
gradually as individuals gain experience and the population slowly converges to a 
stable level of scrounging after sufficient time. 
In this study we provide the first experimental test of the new expected level of 
scrounging to test whether this linear operator learning model represents an 
empirically valid way to predict the outcomes of individual decisions in complex 
frequency-dependent foraging conditions. We test this navel prediction using captive 
flocks of zebra finches , Taeniopygia guttata. Specifically, we ask whether increasing 
the degree of variance in patch quality, while keeping its mean constant, will affect 
the frequency of scrounging in flocks of foraging captive zebra finches . 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Study subjects 
We used zebra finches purchased from a local supplier, L'oisellerie de l' Estrie, QC, 
Canada. These social granivorous birds have been widely used to test predictions of 
PS games (Beauchamp, 2000b, 2001 , 2006; Biondolillo, Stamp, Woods, & Smith, 
1997; David, Cézilly, & Giraldeau, 2011 ; David & Giraldeau, 2012; Giraldeau et al ., 
1990; Mathot & Giraldeau, 2008, 201 O; Mathot et al ., 2009). We randomly selected 
20 males from our colony of 32 males. 
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Before the experiments, the birds were kept in groups of three to fo ur individuals in 
small home cages (29 x 52 x 38 cm) with ad libitum access to water, a mixture of 
vitamin-supplemented seeds, and regular access to vegetables and egg mi xture. Room 
temperature was maintained at 24 ± 1 °C on a 12: 12 h li ght:dark cyc le. For 
identificati on, each individual had a co loured leg ring. Ali the birds had previous 
experi ence with the PS game, but none had been used in an experiment fo r at least 1 
year. We randomly assigned the birds to fo ur fl ocks of five birds. 
During the experiments, each bird was temporaril y marked with a dab of nontoxic 
acrylic paint on top of the head. The co lour was randoml y chosen fro m orange, 
yellow, green, blue and purple with the constra int that no two birds in the same fl ock 
had the same co lour. The experiment lasted 15 days fo r each fl ock, and two fl ocks 
were tested concurrently in neighbouring av iari es . The experiments were conducted 
from 9 Jul y to 4 August 201 3 within the animal care fac ility at the Uni versity du 
Quebec à Montreal. Ali experimental procedures complied with the guidelines from 
Canadian Council fo r Animal Care and were approved under protocol 0313-Cl-71 2-
0314 by the UQAM committee for animal care. 
During the experiment, each fl ock was kept in a large indoor av iary (1.5 x 3.8 x 2.3 m 
high) with a 12: 12 h light:dark cyc le (0700- 1900 hours) . Birds had ad libitum access 
to water at ail times and access to a bath 1 day per week. A 1.1 x 1.15 m piece of 
plywood grid in which 1 OO we ll s (1.3 cm diameter and 1 cm depth) had been drilled 
in a grid pattern ( 10 x 10 cm with 10 cm centra l di stance) was placed on the fl oor of 
each av iary. A video camera hung from the ce iling 1.9 m from fl oor, directl y above 
the center of the grid so that the image captured the whole grid surface . 
2.3.2 Experimental Procedure 
The fl ock was allowed two consecutive days within the av1ary to famili arize 
themselves with their surroundings. During thi s time, two feeders fill ed with millet 
seeds were placed on the grid. Ali food was removed from the av iaries at 1'800 hours 
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on day 2. The next morning five trials were conducted for one flock at 30 mm 
intervals starting at 0800 hours and ending at 1000 hours. Trials for the second flock 
were started with a 15 min delay at 0815 hours, using the same procedure. 
At the beginning of a trial , the experimenter (M.A.) entered the aviary, turned on the 
camera, and filled six randomly chosen patches with white millet seeds. To prevent 
the birds from recognizing or remembering the location of the full patches on the 
grid, the experimenter filled six experimental patches and mimed the addition of 
seeds at six empty patches, visiting the 12 patches in random order. He then covered 
the grid with a sheet of opaque white corrugated plastic (Coroplast) before exiting the 
aviary. From outside the aviary, the experimenter pulled a string to slide the opaque 
covering off the grid. The birds then landed and searched for food on the grid. Each 
trial continued for 9 min, after which the experimenter entered the aviary, cleaned the 
grid of ail food and turned off the camera. 
After the last trial of the day the birds were provided with ad libitum access to food 
until 1800 hours, when ail food was removed. This procedure was repeated from day 
3 to day 8 and then again from day 10 to day 15. During day 9, the birds had no trials 
and were provided with ad libitum food, water and bath. Days 3 and 10, the first day 
of each treatment, were considered training days and no data were collected. At the 
end of the l 5th day we returned the birds to their holding colony. 
Each flock was tested in two treatments, variable and nonvariable patch richness. ln 
the nonvariable treatment, ail six patches in each trial contained exactly l 0 seeds. In 
the variable treatment, there were two patches for each of three richness values: 5, l 0 
and 15 seeds. This changed the patch richness variance from zero (in the nonvariable 
treatment) to 20 (standard deviation of 4.47). Two flocks were randomly selected to 
experience the nonvariable treatment first and then the variable; the other two flocks 
experienced the reverse order. 
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In each trial , one bird was random ly se lected as the focal bird, with the constraint that 
each bird had to be observed once per day (exc luding the tra ining day) and once in 
each time slot over the course of the week. After the experiment was completed fo r 
ail flocks, the videos were viewed in random order by the experimenter, who was 
blind to the treatment type. 
Behavioural observations started when the first bird landed on the grid and continued 
fo r 2 min. We counted find and join events. We defined a ' find event ' when the foca l 
bird pecked seeds from a patch that was unoccupied at the time the bird arri ved at the 
patch. A 'join event ' was noted when the foca l bird pecked seeds fro m a patch where 
at least one other bird was feeding. If the foca l bird ' re-found ' an abandoned patch or 
' re-joined' a prev iously joined patch, we also counted the new event. We then 
calculated the proportion of patches joined by the focal bird in each trial as the 
number of its join events divided by the sum of its join and find events. Similar to 
prev ious studies studies (Beauchamp, Giraldeau, & Ennis, 1997; Coo len, 2002; 
_Mathot et al. , 2009; Morand-Ferron & Gira ldeau, 201 O; Morand- Ferron, Varennes, & 
Gi ra ldeau, 2011 ; Wu & Giraldeau, 2005), we used the proportion of patches fo und by 
joining as an index of the leve l of scrounging fo r the focal individual. We used the 
proportion of patches found by joining rather than the proportion of seeds found by 
joining because it was difficult to obtain a reliable count of the number of seeds from 
the videos, and because Barrette and Giraldeau (2006) have shown that the two give 
similar resul ts. Ali video analys is was conducted using JWatcher (Blumstein & 
Daniel, 2007). The data were then transferred to R (R Deve lopment Core Team, 
2008) fo r statisti cal analys is (Field, Miles, & Field, 201 2; Zuur, Ieno, Walker, 
Saveliev, & Smith , 2009). 
2.3.3 Statistical Analysis 
As the dependent vari able was the proportion of patches di scovered by joining, we 
used a generalized linear mi xed-effect model with binomial distribution (Bolker et al. , 
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2009; Mc Donald, 2009; Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2010). For the model construction 
and selection, we followed the protocol in Zuur et al. (2009). First, we started with a 
mode! that contained ail of our fixed effects: patch richness variance (nonvariable = 
0, variable = 1 ), day of the week, and their interaction as the initial fixed effects. 
Rather than testing the effect of patch richness variance using an intercept of a 
nonexistent ' day O', we were interested in testing the effect on day 5, once the birds 
had time to learn about the treatment. We thus transfonned the day of the week to 
vary from -4 to 0, rather than from 1 to 5, so that the intercept of the mode! 
(transformed value of 0) was on the fifth day of the experiment. We then tested the 
random effects by comparing different random-effect structures, keeping a stable 
fixed-effect structure. We included week ( order of the nonvariable and variable 
treatment), flock identity and bird identity as possible random effects. As the fixed-
effects structure did not change at this step, we selected the mode! with the highest 
conditional variance (R2GLMM(c)) (Bolker et al. , 2009; Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013; 
Schielzeth & Nakagawa, 2013). We then kept the selected random structure, and 
tested for the optimal fixed-effect structure using maximum likelihood estimation by 
Akaike's information criterion (AIC). 
2.4 Results 
One subject became il! during day 3 of the second series and was removed . To keep 
flock size constant we replaced it with a bird from the flocks that were used in the 
first series the previous week. This bird was not used as a focal bird, though, and its 
behaviour was not recorded for the experiment this time. We thus ended up with 19 
data series from 19 focal birds. Each of the 19 birds was used as a focal bird in 10 
trials. ln only one trial (on day 1 ), the focal bird did not land on the grid during the 2 
min in the nonvariable treatment. We thus had a total of 189 trials with val id data. 
Of the random effects, bird identity explained by far the largest amount of variance 
(Table 2.1) and was the only random effect retained in the model. The best model to 
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explain the proportion of patches fo und by joining included treatment, day and their 
interaction. The pro portion of patches fo und thro ugh joining was significantl y higher 
in the variable treatment than in the nonvariable treatment (Table 2.2) . The proportion 
of patches found th rough joining decreased sli ghtly but nonsignificantly overa ll with 
day (Table 2.2). There was also a signifi cant interacti on between patch richness 
variance and day (Table 2.2), such that the proportion of patches that the birds fo und 
by joining increased over time in the variable treatment and decreased over time in 
the nonvariab le treatment (F igure 2. 1 ). lndividuals were consistent in their strategy 
use across both treatments; those that scrounged more in the variable patch treatment 
also scrounged more in the nonvari able patch (Pearson corre lation coeffic ient: r = 
0.83, P < 0.00 1; Figure 2.2) . 
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Table 2.1 Variance explained by different random-effect structures of the 
GLMM on strategy use, using the proportion of patches found by joining as the 
dependent variable 
Random effect(s) in the model R2G LMM(m) R2GLMM(c) AIC 
Week• 1.31% 1.31% 714.2 
Flock identity 1.40% 2.5 0% 7 11.9 
Bird identity 2. 14% 42.25% 509.2 
Week* flock identity* bird identity 2.05% 42.9 1% 5 12.1 
Oifferent random-effect structures were compared using the conditi onal vari ance (R2GLMM(cJ) . 
Marginal variance explained (R2GLMM(mJ) and Akaike ' s information criterion (AlC) are also 
shown. Only bird identity was retained as a random effect in the final mode!. 
"Order of the non vari able and vari able treatment. 
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Table 2.2 Fixed effects of the GLMM on strategy use, using the proportion 
of patches found by joining as the dependent variable 
Estima te SE Z score p 
(Intercept) 0.017 0.429 0.039 0.969 
Treatment a 0.831 0.309 2.688 0.007 
Day b 
-0.171 0.089 -1.932 0.054 
Treatment*day 0.465 0.127 3.647 <0.001 
Significant effects are shown in bold . 
• Nonvariable patch richness = O; variable patch richness = 1. 
b Days 1 to 5 were transformed to -4 to 0 (see text for explanation). 
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• 
• 
• 
Strategy consistency across the two treatments (nonva riable and 
variable patch richness). A scatter plot of the average proportion of patches found by 
joining in the variable treatment and the nonvariable treatment for individuals in four 
flocks offive zebra finches, Taeniopygia guttata. 
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2.5 Discussion 
Our experimental results show that the linear operator learning model (Afshar & 
Giraldeau, 2014) represents an empirically valid means to predict the outcomes of 
individual decisions in complex social foraging situations with frequency dependence 
that cannot be analysed using conventional evolutionary game theory. We conclude 
this because our results confirm a totally nove) prediction of the simulation mode! to 
the effect that scrounging increases with the variance in patch quality. This prediction 
has not previously been made by any of the game-theoretic models of social foraging. 
We discuss the implications for both social foraging and the prediction of behaviour 
in complex social conditions. 
The significant effect of patch richness variance and its significant interaction with 
day (Table 2.2), supports the linear operator model. As predicted, the birds graduall y 
increased their level of scrounging over time in the variab le treatment and decreased 
it over time in the non variable treatment (Figure 2.1 ). As a consequence, on the last 
day of each treatment, the birds scrounged significantly more in the variable 
treatment than they did in the nonvariable treatment. In fact, this graduai change over 
time is exactly what we would expect if the birds were using a learning rule to adjust 
their scrounging behaviour, and is similar to what we see in the simulation results of 
Afshar and Giraldeau (2014). Consequently, had the birds been given more time, the 
difference between the proportion of patches scrounged in the variable and 
nonvariable patch treatments wou ld likely have become even more prominent. 
This increase in scrounger use with increasing variance in patch quality may be 
consistent with risk-sensitive foraging behaviour (Giraldeau & Caraco, 2000). Wu 
and Giraldeau (2005) argued that producing was a more uncertain foraging strategy 
than scrounging because producers rely on their own effort and have a more variable 
payoff than scroungers (Rita & Ranta, 1998). Scrounging, therefore, is thought to be 
a variance-averse strategy (Koops & Giraldeau, 1996; Lendvai et al. , 2004) because 
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scroungers can exploit the effort of several individuals and are thus less sensitive to 
changes in patch quality variance than they are to the average patch richness (F lynn 
& Gira ldeau, 200 1 ). Scrounging more under increased patch variance may therefore 
offer a stable so lution to a less certain environment (Afshar & Gira ldeau, 20 14; 
Lendvai et al., 2004; Rita & Ranta, 1998). This is even more li kely when the average 
patch richness is large enough to consistentl y prov ide the minimum amount of energy 
fo r survival, as was the case in our experiment. 
We fo und that individuals were consistent in their strategy use across both treatments 
(F ig. 2). Similar consistent individual diffe rences in strategy use during the PS game 
have been reported when patch quality is constant within treatments but diffe rs 
between treatments (Morand-Ferron, Varennes, & Gira ldeau, 20 11 ; Morand-Ferron, 
Wu, & Giraldeau, 2011 ). Thi s suggests that individuals are not identical in their 
strategy use. lndividual diffe rences, such as di ffe rences in the speed of learning, may 
affect the way that individuals learn. When individuals in a population have different 
speeds of learning, fast individuals respond more quickly to spatiotemporal 
fluctuat ions. For example, when the payoff of a strategy drops temporaril y, fast 
individuals will sample alternative options and stop express ing that strategy more 
quickly. ln a frequency-dependent situati on, thi s quick response can recover the 
payoff of the strategy. It thus removes the need fo r other individuals to sample 
alternative behav iours. ln our experiment, fo r example, when individuals were 
introduced to an environment that favo ured a hi gher leve l of scrounging, quick 
increases in the level of scrounging by some individuals would have reduced the need 
fo r others to change their strategies. Thi s might explain why some indi viduals were 
so consistent in their strategy use regardless of the treatment, while others were more 
fl exible (Figure 2.2). 
lncorporating nonidentical individuals would allow us to explore questions about 
which type of individuals produce more and why. We thus argue that integrating 
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individual differences into the model would be an important next step towards 
increasing the realism of situations for which we need behavioural predictions. 
Kurvers, Hamblin, and Giraldeau (2012), for example, modelled a PS game where 
individuals had different levels of exploratory behaviour. They found that 
environments with a high patch density favoured fast-exploring individuals. Another 
way to integrate individual differences would be to use our linear operator learning 
simulation and allow for individuals to be endowed with different learning rates or 
different levels of prior experience with the environment. 
Afshar and Giraldeau (2014) have already demonstrated that the linear operator 
model regenerates the vast majority of results and predictions from previous 
producer- scrounger studies and does so in a single united framework. lt also made a 
new prediction that was experimentally supported by the results of the experiment 
presented here. This prediction would have been rather difficult to make using 
conventional game-theoretic models and in fact no model had yet addressed the 
question of the effect of patch variance in a PS game. As Fawcett et al. (2014) 
argued, studies on decision making and behaviour generally suffer from 
oversimpliftcation, white trying to study the behaviour in a complex heterogeneous 
environment. We therefore argue that learning rule models are better tools, in terms 
of both simplicity of the models and their capability to handle more complex 
situations, to study and predict animal behaviour in frequency-dependent systems 
than is the ESS approach. 
We acknowledge that an optimal learning rule is both a consequence and an outcome 
of an evolutionary process and so is not divorced from it. Such a learning rule, be it 
linear operator or any other, may be what Maynard Smith called evolutionary stable 
learning rule, a learning rule whose characteristics lead the population within a 
generation to the same equilibrium combination as would frequency-dependent 
selection over generations (Maynard Smith, 1982). lt is however important to 
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emphas ize the diffe rence between the two approaches, evo lutionary game theory 
versus learning (Afshar & Giraldeau, 20 14). ln addi tion to dealing with experimental 
realism, the learning approach is part icul arl y powerfu l in pred ict ing the individual 
behav iour fo r which evolutionary game models remain entirely sil ent. More 
importantly, evo lutionary game theory models cannot dea l we ll with multiple 
ecological parameters that match more rea li stic environments. Agent-based models 
using learning rules therefore prov ide a convenient alternati ve to study the outcome 
of individual dec isions in complex soc ial situations. Recent growing interest in the 
behav iour of individuals within behav ioural eco logy (Réale & Dingemanse, 20 12) 
raises the importance of hav ing more powerful predicti ve too ls capable of generating 
expectations at the individual level. The linear operator learn ing sim ul ation approach 
(Afshar & Gira ldeau, 201 4) therefore appears to be an empiri ca ll y va l id means to 
generate the expected outcomes within gro ups of individuals engaged in complex 
games with freq uency-dependent payoffs. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
THE EVOLUTION OF LEARN rN G AN D NON-LEARNrNG RULES IN 
DYNAM IC ENV IRONMENTS : A TEST OF THE BEHAV IOU RA L GAMBIT 
Afshar, M., & Giraldeau, L.-A. (20 14). The evo lution of learning and non-learning 
ru les in dynamic environments: A test of the behav ioural gambi t. For submission to 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 
3.1 Abstract 
Learning, a way to adapt to environmental changes, has been studied for decades by 
behav ioural eco logists using models based on learn ing rules perfo rming within a 
soc ial forag ing context. Most of these studies, however, had two important 
shortcomings: learning rules were rarely vetted against non-learning ru les and the 
environmental variance required for learning was rarely present within an 
individual's li fetime. Furthermore, we still do not understand the conditions 
necessary fo r learning to evo lve initially. ln this study, we explore the conditi ons 
under which a linear operator type of learning is expected to evolve in a frequency-
dependent context like a producer-scrounger (PS) game, where producer search fo r 
food and scrounger obtain foo d by joining others. ln doing so, we address both 
limitations of earli er studies by allowing fi xed strategies to compete against learning 
strategies in environments that are stable, vary, within generations or vary between 
generations. We fo und that ail populations with similar group size converged to a 
similar proportion of join tactic, regardless of whether ind iv iduals used a pure 
strategy, mi xed strategy, or linear operator learning strategy. Our results show that the 
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pure strategy is superior to both the mixed strategy and the linear operator learning 
strategy across a majority of the environmental conditions. Depending on the type 
and magnitude of environmental fluctuations , learning may either be dominated by 
fixed rules or it can coexist with pure strategies. This result suggests that, at least 
within the context of producer-scrounger game, learning generates a combination of 
strategy use that corresponds to that expected from selection acting on genetic 
alternatives and we can therefore accept the behavioural gambit when studying 
population level equilibrium. 
Keywords: producer-scrounger, learning rule, decision making, frequency-dependent 
selection, Evolutionary game theory, social foraging, pure strategy, mixed strategy, 
polymorphism, linear operator, behavioural gambit 
3.2 Introduction 
Learning can be broadly defined as "a change in state due to experience. [ .. . ] The 
changes in state referred to as learning seem to involve a change in cognitive state, 
not just behavioral potential" (Shettleworth, 2010, pp. 98-99). The underlying 
mechanism for learning has been studied for decades by psychologists (Shettleworth, 
2010) and more recently by behavioural ecologists (Dugatkin & Reeve, 2000; Dunlap 
& Stephens, 2009; Harley, 1981; Henly et al. , 2008; Kacelnik & Krebs, 1985 ; 
McNamara & Houston, 1985 ; Niv, Joel , Meilijson, & Ru pp in, 2002; Stephens, 1991 ). 
ln behavioural ecology, a popular tradition has been to model the process as a 
" learning rule", a mathematical expression that combines previous experiences and 
then uses this information to assigna probability to each possible behaviour of being 
expressed at a given time (Aoki & Feldman, 2014; Arbilly et al. , 2011 ; Dridi & 
Lehmann, 2014; Dubois et al ., 2010; Fawcett et al. , 2014; GroB et al ., 2008; Hamblin 
& Giraldeau, 2009; Katsnelson et al. , 2012; Kolodny et al., 2014; Lotem & Biran-
Yoeli , 2014; Rendell et al. , 2010; Trimmer et al. , 2012). Severa( studies have 
observed learning rules performing within a social foraging context, especially for the 
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producer-scroun ger game (Afshar & Giraldeau, 20 14; Arbill y et al., 201 0, 20 11 ; 
Beauchamp, 2000a; Dridi & Lehmann, 20 14; Hamblin & Gira ldeau, 2009 ; 
Katsnelson et al. , 20 12), but most of these studies have been plagued with two 
important shortcomings: learning rul es are rare ly vetted aga inst non-learning ru les 
and the enviro nmental variance requi red fo r learning to be of any va lue is rare ly 
present within an individual's li fetime. Furthermore, we do not know what conditions 
are necessary fo r learning to evo lve in the first place, and accepting that it will always 
generate a combination of strategies that corresponds to that expected fro m selection 
acting on geneti c alternatives (what Gira ldeau and Dubois 2008 describe as accepting 
the Behavioural Gambit) may be incorrect (Fawcett et al. , 20 13; McNamara & 
Houston, 2009). 
Severa! studies invest igated the des ign of an optimal learning ru le (Dridi & Lehmann, 
201 4; Fawcett et al. , 20 14; Harley, 198 1; Houston & Sumida, 1987; Kacelnik & 
Krebs, 1985 ; Kace lni k et al. , 1987; Lea & Dow, 1984; March, 1996; Trimmer et al., 
201 2). Beauchamp (2000) was one of the first studies to compare the optimali ty of 
different learning rules by letting them compete against each other in a sim ulated 
forag ing game. He compared three rules: linear operator, perfect memory, and 
relative payoff sum within the context of two social forag ing games: producer-
scrounger and ideal free distribution. The linear operator rul e yielded consistently 
higher payoffs than other learni ng rules across various contexts, while the re lat ive 
payoff sum rule performed poorly, especially in the idea l free distribution. 
Beauchamp (2000), however, se lected the parameters of the learning ru les arbitrarily. 
We therefore cannot be sure whether the success of the linear operator over the others 
was due to the parameters chosen or to the form of the ru le itself. Furthermore, the 
study never pi tted learning rules against fi xed players and so it is not clear whether 
learning was actually the best so lution in these games. 
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Hamblin and Giraldeau (2009) addressed the issue of arbitrary parameter choice by 
using genetic algorithm simulations to first find the best parameter combinations for 
each rule in a producer-scounger game. Once the optimal parameter values for each 
rule were established, each rule played against the others in a round-robin tournament 
seeking the rule that would evolve to fixation. The relative payoff sum performed 
better than either the linear operator or perfect memory rules, but as in Beauchamp 
(2000) these ru les were never tested against fixed players. 
By omitting non-learning fixed players, both the studies of Beauchamp (2000) and 
Hamblin and Giraldeau (2009) implicitly assumed that learning was superior to fixed 
behaviour in social foraging games. This is surprising given that several studies have 
shown that learning only outperforms fixed individuals when there are environmental 
fluctuations (Dubois et al., 201 O; Dunlap & Stephens, 2009; Grol3 et al. , 2008; 
Katsnelson et al. , 2012 ; Stephens, 1991 ). If the environ ment is stable, as was the case 
in Hamblin and Giraldeau (2009) , the fixed individuals may very well have 
outperformed the learning individuals. ln fact, the optimal parameters of the best 
relative payoff sum in the Hamblin and Giraldeau (2009) study paradoxically 
generated almost fixed behaviour in its players. 
Sorne studies, however, have investigated the value of learning over fixed non-
learning strategies. For instance, Dubois, Morand-Ferron, and Giraldeau (2010) found 
that flexible learning individuals can invade population of inflexible individuals in a 
producer-scrounger game, but learning individuals can never evolve to fixation. 
Compared to fixed pure producers or pure scroungers, learners can outperform one 
but not both fixed strategies. However, the study simply assumes that learners are 
omniscient and know at no cost the payoff of both search and join tactic 
instantaneously and so does not consider alternative learning rules . Katsnelson et al. 
(2012) compared the linear operator ru le with pure and mixed strategies while 
explicitly modeling the learning rule. They found that the linear operator rule can 
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invade a population of non-learners and even evolve to fixation if there is either 
sufficient environmental fluctuations or phenotypic asymmetries among individuals. 
Although they compared the linear operator rule with either pure or mixed strategies, 
they never pitted ail three together. Furthermore, Katsnelson et al. (2012), as well as 
Hamblin and Giraldeau (2009), Arbilly et al. (2010), and Arbilly et al. (2011) , only 
consider between-generation environmental fluctuations , ignoring within-generation 
fluctuations. This is surprising, given that learning can evolve when there is within 
generation changes, although very highly variable environment can discourage 
learning (Stephens, 1991 ). 
Previous studies (Arbilly et al. , 2010, 2011; Dubois et al. , 201 O; Hamblin & 
Giraldeau, 2009; Katsnelson et al. , 2012; Trimmer et al. , 2012) were interested in 
determining which strategy becomes fixed in the population. However, the main 
question in our opinion should be when to expect the stable coexistence of different 
strategies in the same population. lt is therefore also necessary to determine the 
conditions under which no strategy is expected to reach fixation , and to monitor the 
average frequency of each strategy in the population . 
In this study, we explore the conditions under which a linear operator type of learning 
rule could evolve in a frequency-dependent context like a producer-scrounger game. 
In doing so, we address the limitations of earlier studies by pitting fixed strategies 
against learning strategies in environments that are stable, vary within-generation or 
vary between-generations. We also measure the frequency of each strategy during the 
process rather than look only for fixation so that we can investigate when multiple 
strategies are expected to coexist simultaneously. 
3.3 Simulation model 
We chose the linear operator as the base structure for the learning rule in this study 
because it was found to be favoured by natural selection in a simulation study 
(Trimmer et al. , 2012) and a recent agent-based simulation based on a linear operator 
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learning strategy was remarkably successful in replicating almost every published 
prediction and empirical result from the producer-scrounger game (Afshar & 
Giraldeau, 2014). The linear operator is simple and has fewer parameters than 
alternative learning rules (e.g. relative payoff sum; Harley 1981 ; perfect memory; 
Houston & Sumida 1987). It also provides the basic structure for many more 
complicated forms of reinforcement learning ru les (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Moreover, 
it has been used previously in producer-scrounger game in competition with other 
learning rules (Beauchamp, 2000a; Hamblin & Giraldeau, 2009) , with non-learning 
strategies (Arbilly & Laland, 2014; Katsnelson et al. , 2012) , and alone (Arbilly et al. , 
2010). 
The simulation starts with a generation of individuals initialized using the parameters 
of Table 3 .1. An individual can have one of the three strategies, pure, m ixed, or linear 
operator. The type of the strategy is determined by L1 . For a pure strategy (L1 = 1), 
the individual 's genes fix the tactic and depending on the pure strategy genotype (L 2) , 
the individual either always joins or always searches throughout its lifetime. For a 
mixed strategy (L1 = 2), an individual demonstrates both tactics with a fixed 
probability throughout its life. The probability of join tactic (1 - probability of search 
tactic) is fixed by the individual's genes (L3 ) and does not change during its lifetime. 
For a linear operator strategy (L1 = 3), the individual has flexible behaviour. lt uses 
the linear operator learning rule to learn the current payoffs to each tactic, and so can 
respond to environmental changes that affect these payoffs (Afshar & Giraldeau, 
2014). The individual adjusts its behaviour to try to maximize the amount of food 
gained, deciding whether to search or join by using the following linear operator rule : 
Vi(t) = Vi(t - 1) + x (Pi(t) - Vi(t - 1)), Vi(o) = unij(o,1), O<X<l where Vi(t) and 
Pi(t) are the estimated value and observed payoff for tactic i at time t respectively. x 
is the learning rate and is determined by L4 (1 - x is the memory factor). The previous 
estimation was Vi(t - 1), and Pi(t) - Vi(t - 1) is therefore the difference between the 
observed payoff and the previous estimated value. The update is conducted only for 
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the estimated value of the most recently used tactic. The estimated value remains 
unchanged, Vi(t) = Vi(t - 1), for the tactic that has not been sampled at time t. The 
individual then decides between the two tactics using either maximizing or matching 
ratio , depending on L5 . When maximizing, the individual chooses the tactic with the 
highest estimated payoff. When matching, the individual performs the tactics in 
proportion to their relative estimated payoff. 
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Table 3.1 Genetie algorithm chromosome description and initial values 
Locus Parameter Range Mutation bound 
Li Strategy: Pure (1), Mixed (2), Linear operator (3) 1,2,3 1, 2, 3 
Lz Pure strategy gene: Search tactic ( 1 ), Join tactic (2) 1, 2 1, 2 
L3 Mixed strategy gene: Probabi lity ofusingjoin tactic [O, l] ±0.l 
L4 Linear operator memory factor [O, 1] ±0.1 
Ls Linear operator decision rule: Maximizing (0), Matching 0, 1 0, 1 
(1) 
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In the simu lation model, a group of individuals forage in a G*G grid, representing a 
virtual environment. Ti me is divided into discrete steps, each of which can be thought 
of as one sampling event in the real world. An individual who searches, encounters 
patches accord ing to the patch encounter probability. Simultaneous discoveries by 
different individuals are possible when they concurrently use the search tactic. An 
individual who joins, sees the location of ail discovered patches and joins the nearest 
patch by moving one grid cell per time step. The patch may be depleted before the 
individual arrives because of other individuals are already present at the patch. 
Upon encountering a food patch the finder receives a fraction of the food in the patch 
called the finder's advantage. Thi s represents the amount of food the finder would be 
able to eat before the joiners arrive. ln the subsequent time steps ail individuals at the 
patch, the finder and those that have joined, receive food at the same food intake rate. 
Competition wou ld normally cause the rate of food intake to be affected by the 
number of scroungers at the patch, but for simplicity we kept intake rate fixed. The 
rate of depletion is th us based on the intake rate and the number of individuals. 
The individuals at the patch continue eating until the patch is depleted, at which point 
each individual either joins or searches again, depending on its strategy. We assume 
that at each time step individuals require a minimum amount of energy to survive, a 
parameter we termed metabolic requirement. If an individual does not meet its 
metabolic requirement, it survives but gets a negative payoff to ensure that there is 
value in exploiting the better tactic more often. This is similar to the concepts of 
energy reserve or energy requirement (Koops & Giraldeau, 1996; Lendvai et al. , 
2004; Wu & Giraldeau, 2005). Individuals must also paya cost of searching or a cost 
of joining. These costs have absolute values and are incurred in each time step, 
depending on the tactic they are playing. After the initialization, the population plays 
producer-scrounger game for 500 time steps. The general parameter settings for the 
game are shown in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 General parameter settings for the producer-scrounger (PS) game 
simulations 
Parameter 
Grid size 
Maximum simulation time step 
Group size 
Metabolic requirement 
Finder's advantage 
Food intake rate 
Cost of searching 
Cost of joining 
Patch encounter probability 
Patch richness (mean) 
Within-generation change 
Between-generation change 
Symbol 
G 
N 
b 
Csearch 
Cj oin 
p 
µ F,static 
Value(s) 
20 X 20 
500 
10, 40, 90 
0.1 25 
0.125 
0.125 
0.1 
20 
Oo/o,25o/o, 50o/o, 75o/o 
Oo/o, 25°/o, 50o/o, 75o/o 
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At the end of the producer-scrounger game we use a process similar to Hamblin and 
Gi raldeau (2009) to generate the next generation of foragers. We rank individuals 
based on their fitness, measured as the lifetime cumulati ve amount of food gained. 
lndividuals with the lowest 10% fitness die. These individuals are then replaced with 
other individuals in the population in proport ion to their fitness. Jndividuals who have 
higher fitness thus have a higher chance of replacing dead individuals. The resul ting 
population will have the same number of individuals and will be the parents of the 
subsequent generation. Parents randoml y pair with a unifo rm di stri bution. Each of the 
fi ve loci (Table 3 .1) may then be exchanged between paired parents with 50% 
probabili ty, as a crossover operation. Finall y, each locus of each gene may mutate 
with the probability of 0.002. The mutation happens by changing the locus by an 
amount within the bounds shown in Table 3.1 . The resulting genes make up the 
individuals of the next generation. Thi s process is repeated fo r 500 generati ons. We 
measured the frequency of each strategy during the last 1 OO generations. 
We used static as well as dynarnic environrnents where diffe rent leve ls of within-
generation and between-generation changes were present. For each configuration, a 
set of 20 genetic algorithm simulations was conducted in Matlab (R20 l 3a) fo r 
Windows (Mathworks, Natick, MA, U.S.A.) . Ali the results are thus averaged over 
the 20 simulat ions. 
We replicated ail simulations with three different group sizes ( 10, 40, and 90). 
Severa! studies have shown that the evo lutionaril y stable proporti on of join tactic 
changes with group size (Afshar & Giraldeau, 20 14; Beauchamp & Gira ldeau, 1996; 
Caraco & Giraldeau, 199 1; Coolen, 2002; Vickery et al. , 199 1 ). Us ing diffe rent group 
sizes thus ensured that the equilibriurn proportion of join tacti c changed and that our 
results were not affected by the value of the equilibriurn . 
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3.3.1 Static environment 
We first tested the mode) in a static environment, where each patch had a fixed value 
of 20 energy units (Table 3.2), with five different strategy configurations, pure 
strategy only (L1 = 1), mixed strategy only (L1 = 2), pure and mixed strategies 
(L1 E {1,2}) , linear operator only (L1 = 3), and ail three strategies together (L1 E 
{1,2,3}). For each strategy configuration we tested three different group sizes ( 10, 40, 
and 90). 
3.3.2 Dynamic environment 
We studied both types of environmental fluctuation: within-generation change and 
between-generation change. To simulate within-generation change, individuals 
experienced three different conditions during their li fetime, an intermediate condition 
similar to the static environment, µF = µF ,statici a condition with smaller patch 
richness, µF * (1 - Llµ,w) , and a condition with larger patch richness, µF * 
( 1 + Llµ,w ), compared to the intermediate condition. The patch richness in the 
intermediate condition (µF ,static) was 20 units. We tested four different values of 
Llµ,w, 0%, 25%, 50%, and 75% to see the effect of the amount of within-generation 
change. Within each condition, though, ail patches had the same value. 
ln each simulation, ail individuals first encountered the condition with low patch 
richness for one third of the simulation. Severa! models predict that animais should 
join less when patch richness is lower (Afshar & Giraldeau, 2014; Beauchamp & 
Giraldeau, 1996; Ruxton & Beauchamp, 2008 ; Vickery et al. , 1991 ). We therefore 
expected to see the highest amount of searching in this environment. Individuals then 
encountered the intermediate patch richness condition for a third of the time, and then 
the higher patch richness condition for the last third of the time. 
With between-generation change, the patch richness changes from generation to 
generation. During each generation, the group encountered one of the three 
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environments with different patch richness (µF ,statici µF ,static * (1 - L1µ ,a),µF ,static * 
(1 + L1µ ,8 )) chosen at random, with a unifo rm distribution. We used fo ur amounts of 
between-generation changes, L1µ ,B = 0%, 25%, 50%, and 75%. 
In our study we had different combinations of within-generation change and between-
generation change. Considering the four levels of each one, we ended up with 16 
different configurations. The case where both L1µ ,w and L1µ ,B are 0% is equal to a 
static environment. The case with L1µ ,w > 0% and L1 µ, 8 = 0% represents an environment 
with only within-generati on change. The case with L1µ ,w= 0% and L1µ ,8 > 0% 
represents an environment with only between-generation change. For each 
configuration, we tested three different group sizes ( 10, 40, and 90) with ail th ree 
strategies competing against each other. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Static environment 
We found that regardless of the strategy configuration , the populations converged to 
similar stable proportions of join tactic fo r each group size of 40 or 90 (Table 3.3). 
For small groups of 10 individuals, however, the effect of geneti c drift was strong and 
the groups ended at different proportions of join tacti c. 
For all strategy configurations, we fo und higher proportions of join tactic fo r larger 
group sizes, with the exception of group size 10 with mixed strategy, likely due to 
genetic drift (Table 3.3). The increase in the proportion of join tactic for larger group 
sizes is consistent with previous models and empirical studies (Afshar & Giraldeau, 
2014; Beauchamp & Giraldeau, 1996; Caraco & Giraldeau, 199 1; Vickery et al. , 
199 1). 
Individuals' lifetime average payoff of each tacti c vs . individual's li fetime proportion 
of join tactic shows that when the individual used a higher proportion of join , the 
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payoff of both tactics decreased (Figure 3 .1) as expected in a producer-scrounger 
game. Although the payoff of join was higher for lower proportions of join tactic, it 
decreased as the proportion of join increased and eventually fell below the payoff of 
the search tactic. We found that for ail configurations, the populations evolved to a 
combination of search and join where both tactics had equal payoffs (Figure 3.2). The 
variance in the payoff for the join tactic, however, was larger than that for the search 
tactic. 
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Table 3.3 Final proportion of join tactic (Means ± SE) for groups of 
individuals playing a producer-scrounger game using different types of 
strategies in a static environment, Llµ ,W = 0% and Llµ ,8 = 0%, after 500 
generations. The final proportion was calculated by averaging over the last 100 
generations (N = 20) 
Group size 
Possible strategies 
90 JO 40 
Pure strategy only 0.15±0.06 0.39±0.05 0.58± 0.03 
Mixed strategy only 0.49±0.34 0.41±0.05 0.60±0.03 
Pure and mixed strategies 0.15±0.07 0.40±0.05 0.59±0.03 
Linear operator 0.33±0.22 0.44±0.06 0.60±0.03 
Pure, mixed, and linear operator strategies 0.14±0.07 0.40±0.05 0.59±0.03 
84 
o.6 
· Search 
· Join 
0 
0 0.2 o.6 o.8 1 
Proportion ofjoin tactic 
Figure 3.1 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy plot for producer-scrounger 
game for groups of 90 individuals engaged in choosing tactics using pure 
strategy, mixed strategy, or linear operator learning rule in a static 
environment, Llµ,W = 0% and Llµ,8 = 0%. Each point shows the lifetime average 
payoff of each tactic (per time step) for one individual vs. its lifetime proportion 
of join tactic. The general parameter settings for ail simulations are shown in 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. 
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--- Join - Search 
0.25 
0.2 
0 100 200 300 400 500 
Generation 
Figure 3.2 Payoff of search and join tactics in producer- scrounger game 
for groups of 90 individuals engaged in choosing tactics using pure strategy, 
mixed strategy, or linear operator learning rule in a static environment during 
500 generations. Means ±SE are shown (N=20). The general parameter settings 
for ail simulations are shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. To keep the graph 
readable, only the results for every five generations is shown. 
86 
When both pure strategies and mixed strategies compete with each other in the same 
population in a static environment, the final combination is close to fixation with 
majority of the population using pure strategies (Table 3.4). Even the small 
proportion of mixed strategies behaved like a pure strategy, by having genotypes 
close to one (being similar to pure joiners) or close to zero (being similar to pure 
searchers). Similarly, when ail individuals used a mixed strategy, the final frequency 
distribution of mixed strategy genotypes is made up of genotypes that are close to 
either one or zero , and therefore similar to pure strategies (Figure 3.3). Even when we 
added the linear operator, the pure strategy was still dominant (Table 3.4 and Figure 
3.4). The frequency of individuals with the linear operator learning rule strategy 
increased with group size, but remained insignificant compared to pure and mixed 
strategies. 
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Table 3.4 Final frequency of different strategies (Means ± SE) when 
competing with each other in producer-scrounger game in a static environment 
during 500 generations. The final frequency was calculated by averaging over 
the last 100 generations (N = 20). 
Possible strategies 
Pure strategy and mixed 
strategy 
Ali three strategies 
Pure strategy 
I Mixed strategy 
Pure strategy 
Mix ed strategy 
Liner operator 
10 
99%± 1% 
1%±1% 
98%± 1% 
l o/o± l o/o 
1%±0% 
Croup size 
40 90 
97%± 1% 83%±3% 
3o/o±l % l 7o/o±3% 
96%± 1% 89o/o±2% 
2%± 1% 7o/o± l % 
2%± 1% 3o/o± I% 
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Figure 3.3 The histogram of frequency of different mixed strategy 
genotypes for individuals that play producer-scrounger game using only mixed 
strategy in a static environment during 500 generations. Mixed strategy 
genotype is the threshold to randomly choose between search or join tactic. 
Despite the initially uniform distribution, the mixed strategy genotype finally 
converged to either close to one (only join) or close to zero (only search). We can 
therefore say that even populations of mixed strategists evolved to behave 
similar to pure strategists. Frequencies are shown for the last 100 generations 
when the populations have become stable. The general parameter settings for ail 
simulations are shown m Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. 20 simulations were 
performed and each colour represents the result of one of the 20 simulations. 
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Figure 3.4 
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 
~neration 
400 450 500 
The evolution of different strategies in a producer-scrounger 
game for groups of 90 individuals engaged in choosing tactics using pure 
strategy, mixed strategy, or a linear operator learning rule in a static 
environment during 500 generations (N = 20). After initial changes in the 
distribution of strategies, the pure strategy remains dominant in the populations 
for the remainder of the simulation. The linear operator learning strategy thus 
has no advantage over inflexible strategies, either pure or mixed strategies. The 
general parameter settings for ail simulations are shown in Table 3.1 and Table 
3.2. 
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3.4.2 Dynamic environment 
We found that both within-generation change (Llµ,w) and between-generation change 
(Llµ,8 ) can increase the percentage of the linear operator strategy in the population 
(Table 3.5, Figure 3.5a, and Appendix A). As the amount of environmental change, 
either Llµ,w or Llµ,8 , increases, this effect becomes stronger. The population, however, 
remains dominated by pure strategy. 
Between-generation change had stronger effects than within-generation change and 
the proportion of the linear operator strategy was often larger than for within-
generation change (Table 3.5 , Figure 3.5a, and Appendix A). Out of the 16 
configurations, individuals with linear operator represented the majority of the 
population in only five cases, four of which was when the between-generation change 
was 75% (Table 3.5). We, however, did not find any situation where the linear 
operator reached fixation. 
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3.5 Discuss ion 
We fo und that, depend ing on the type and the intensity of environmenta l variabili ty, 
learning may either be completely di splaced by fi xed rules or, at best, it can coexist 
with pure strategies. We discuss the conditions under which each of these situat ions 
apply and then relate thi s to the validity of accepting the behav ioural gambi t. 
For ail configurations of the simulat ion, the payoffs obtained from each strategy 
behaved as assumed by a producer-scrounger Game. Consequently the populations 
evolved to an equili brium where search and join tactics obta ined equal payoffs 
(F igure 3.2). Furthermore, when an ind iv idual joined less than thi s equilibrium, the 
join tactic received a higher payoff than the search tacti c, which should cause them to 
join more if they use linear operator strategy, but when an individual joined more 
than the equilibrium the join tacti c had a lower payoff than the search tacti c, which 
should cause them to join less if they use 1 inear operator strategy (F igure 3 .1 ). We can 
therefore argue that the populations had converged to the evolutionaril y stable 
strategy (ESS) equilibrium which, once reached, cannot be invaded by alternative 
combinati ons of search and join tacti cs. lt is worth noting that our simulation 
provides the first numerical demonstration of the evolutionaril y stable strategy payoff 
plot based on the outcome of an actual agent-based producer-scrounger game mode! 
(Figure 3.1 ). The functi ons obtained appear to match those measured in empirical 
tests of the producer-scrounger game with house sparrows (Passer domesticus, 
Barnard and Sibly 198 1) and with nutmeg mannikins (Lonchura punctulata, Mottl ey 
and Giraldeau 2000). 
Katsnelson et al. (201 2) report that a mixed strategy can in vade a population of pure 
strategies and evolve to fi xation. Our results contradict thi s because in the stati c 
environments the pure strategy dominated the mixed strategy (Table 3.4). Moreover, 
the small propo1tion of individuals that use a mixed strategy acted like pure 
strategists by hav ing mixed strategy genotypes close to one or zero (Figure 3.3). Thi s 
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difference in conclusion between our study and Katsnelson et al. (2012) is likely 
attributable to two distinguishing features. Katsnelson et al. (2012) set the producer-
scrounger game parameters such that the optimal solution is an equal proportion of 
join and search tactics . The mixed strategy individuals, therefore, already had the 
optimal behaviour even before the evolutionary process began and so enjoyed an 
unfair advantage in competition with the other fixed strategies. This was not so in our 
study. In addition in Katsnelson et al. (2012) the mixed strategies were constrained to 
always use the join tactic 50% of the time. No change was therefore possible within 
the mixed strategy. In our study, however, the proportion of join tactic used by the 
mixed strategy genotype (L3 ) could evolve along with other alleles, including the 
strategy itself (L1). We argue that in a genetic algorithm study in order to draw robust 
conclusions it is important to allow the parameters of ail strategies to change and 
adapt without placing strong constraints on any one of them. 
Our finding that the pure strategy completely dominates the mixed strategy in a static 
environment (Table 3.4) supports the predictions of earlier game models (Vickery 
1987, 1988) that in a finite population only pure strategies should be expected from 
purely deterministic dynamics and that no mixed strategy can be an ESS . On the 
other hand, our result contradicts arguments based on stochastic dynamics that when 
the frequency of one pure strategist is low at the ESS, stochastic environmental 
fluctuations may cause its extinction and hence lead to the fixation of mixed 
strategies (Bergstrom & Godfrey-Smith, 1998; Maynard Smith, 1988; Orzack & 
Hines, 2005). These contradictory predictions highlight the importance of the 
deterministic or stochastic nature of the dynamics and our results suggest that the 
producer-scrounger game may favour the deterministic assumptions of Vickery 
( 1987, 1988) rather than the stochastic assumptions. This result appears robust given 
that we included random between-generation fluctuations and random initial values in 
our simulated producer-scrounger game. 
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We found that in a static environment the pure strategy dominates both the linear 
operator and the mixed strategies (Table 3.4 and Figure 3.4). This is not surprising 
because many models have already predicted that learning is of no use when there is 
no environmental change (Dubois et al. , 20 1 O; Dunlap & Stephens, 2009; Grof3 et al. , 
2008; Katsnelson et al. , 2012; Stephens, 1991 ). ln this case, innate behaviour can 
outperform flexible behaviours based on learning (Stephens, 1991 ). ln the absence of 
between-generation change, the frequency of the learning strategy remains low even 
when we introduced within-generation environmental changes, with the exception of 
extreme environmental changes (Llµ,w= 75 %) with the large group size (Table 3.5 and 
Figure 3.5c). ln our model , the fitness of an individual is measured based on the 
lifetime food intake. Lifetime food intake includes ail three periods of different 
environmental conditions (µF,µF * (1- Llµ,w),µF * (1 + Llµw)). When the 
environment changes during an individual ' s lifetime but the same amount of changes 
repeats for several generations, innate behaviour can outperform learning. This is 
especially true, when a smalt portion of population uses the learning strategy (Table 
3.5 and Figure 3.5c). This portion of the population can act as a buffer and 
compensate for individuals that consistently show a higher or lower level proportion 
of join tactic (Dubois et al. , 2010). lt therefore buffers the inflexible strategies from 
the force of natural selection. 
Between-generation change had stronger effects on strategy type than within-
generation change and the proportion of the linear operator strategy was often higher 
than for within-generation change (Table 3.5 and Figure 3.5a). We found the highest 
proportion of linear operator strategies when there was highest amount of between-
generation changes and highest amount of within-generation change (Table 3.5 and 
Figure 3.5c). ln this case, innate behaviour that is optimal for one generation might 
not be useful for the following generation. It is therefore important to adapt and find 
the optimal proportion of join tactic in each generation. This can be done only with a 
flexible strategy su ch as the 1 inear operator. However, the intrinsic frequency-
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dependency property of the producer-scrounger game implies that when one 
individual changes its behaviour it also affects the performance of other individuals in 
the population creating, once again, a buffer effect by adjusting their behaviour until 
the payoffs of both tactics are equal. When this happens there is no advantage to 
flexibility for the remaining fixed individuals and so, as was the case in Dubois et al. 
(2010) the linear operator cannot evolve to fixation in the population (Table 3.5 and 
Figure 3.5c). Although Katsnelson et al. (2012) also found that the frequency of 
learning individuals in the population increases with the magnitude of the between-
generation environmental change they observe the learning strategy evolving to 
fixation . There are several possible reasons for the difference between our results and 
those of Katsnelson et al. (2012). One has already been addressed and concerns the 
constrained parameters of the mixed strategy. But they also kept a fixed memory 
factor for the linear operator strategy at one of three values: 0.5, 0.85, and 0.95. 
lnstead we allowed the memory factor (L5) to evolve freely. Moreover, Katsnelson et 
al. (2012) studied the linear operator a long with either the pure strategy or the mixed 
strategy but there was no situation where ail three competed together. As Katsnelson 
et al. (2012) suggested, the benefit of the linear operator may corne in part by 
demonstrating a mixed combination of both tactics , similar to a mixed strategy. This 
may give it an advantage when competing with a pure strategy. However, when ail 
three strategies play together, as in our study, the linear operator strategy may be Jess 
likely to evolve to fixation. We can think of the game involving the strategies as a 
Rock-Scissor-Paper game, where each strategy is better than one other strategy, but 
none is better than ail. Our results underscore the importance of playing ail strategies 
together in order to obtain robust conclusions. 
We found that, regardless of the possible strategies, ail populations with similar group 
size converged to a comparable proportion of join tactics (Table 3.3), suggesting that 
the ESS is independent of the mechanisms that governs the decision-making of 
individuals. This fact provides us with two important results. First, regardless of 
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whether the populati on uses pure, mi xed, or learning strategies, we can expect the 
effects of environmental parameters on the population proportion of join tacti c to be 
similar to those predicted by Afshar and Giraldeau (2014) where ail individuals in the 
population used linear operator to choose between search and join tactics . 
Second , when the research interest is in the population level behav ior in a static 
environment, behavioral ecologists can continue using the behaviora l gambit and 
assume that the mechani sm in a frequency-dependent situati ons will produce 
outcomes that are the same as those from an evolutionary process . However, if the 
interest is in individual level behav ior or invo lves enviro nmental fluctuati ons, the 
gambit may be wrong and learning should be considered. 
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CHAPTERIV 
GENERAL DISCUSS ION AN D FUTURE DI RECTION S 
My primary goal in thi s thes is was to explore the hypothes is that learning can be as 
powerful as, or in some contexts perhaps even more powerful than, evolution fo r 
predicting animal behav ior. To do thi s 1 proposed a learning based mode! fo r a 
producer-scrounger game and compared it with prev ious published studies , conducted 
an experiment to test the nove! prediction of my mode! using captive fo raging fl ocks 
of male zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata) , and developed second simulation mode! 
to explore the conditions under which learning is expected to evolve in a frequency-
dependent context, each of which were explained in detail in the prev ious chapters. ln 
thi s chapte r, I di scuss my contributions to the fi eld of behav iora l eco logy and the 
implications of my findings for the study of animal behav ior. 
My results demonstrate that adopting a learning approach when studying a frequency-
dependent behav iour is more effective than adopting an evolutionary game-theoretic 
approach. The learning approach was particularl y powerful in two situations: i) when 
more complex, and hence more reali stic, models are requi red and ii ) when ind iv idual 
behav iour needs to be predicted. Evolutionary game moqels cannot easily deal with 
the complexity required of reali stic soc ial fo raging situations. As such , the 
evolutionary game theory models used by behav ioral eco logists fo r the past 30-40 
years have required an oversimplificati on of conditions that has recentl y been 
criticised. More importantly, evo lutionary game theory models cannot deal well with 
multiple eco logical parameters that likely correspond to more realistic environments. 
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Agent-based models using learning rules, simi lar to those 1 used in this thesis, 
provide a convenient alternative to study complex behaviors based on simple 
individual level models . Furthermore, when we need to dig deeper than the 
population level behavior and predict individual level behavior the learning approach 
is again more successfu l than evolutionary game models. Individual behaviour is of 
particular interest to behavioural eco logists who have now discovered the importance 
of persistent individual differences often referred to as "personality" (Réale & 
Dingemanse, 2012). 1 have shown that different populations with simi lar population 
level behavior can indeed have individuals with different behaviours. Sorne of the 
individuals can have fixed behaviours whi le others have flexible behaviours. If one 
studies individual differences, it is important to consider flexible behaviour in 
general, and learning in particular, as a potential source of variation . Neglecting the 
mechanism, i.e. learning, thus means neglecting the behaviour of what can be a 
sign ificant portion of the population when there are high levels of environmental 
fluctuations. Moreover, this means that models developed for studying behaviour in 
static environments may not be appropriate for dynamic environments. 
We can thus argue that two of the early questions a cautious behavioural eco logist 
should ask are first , whether the environment is static and, second, whether he or she 
is interested in behaviour on ly at the population level. If the answer to either of these 
questions is "no", then he or she needs to consider learning as a potential part of the 
mode!. We should thus be careful when using the results of previous or future studies 
that failed to take this into account and, for example, used a mode! entirely based on 
fixed behaviours in a changing environment. 
4.1 Future directions 
The majority of the models on learning in behavioural ecology are based on the 
assumption that either individuals are identical or their individual differences does not 
affect the outcome of the learning process. Researchers later verify these predictions 
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assumption in their experiments. That thi s assumption is so often made is surprising, 
given that indi vidual differences are we ll documented in the literature (Réale & 
Dingemanse, 20 12). For example, in Chapter Il 1 showed that individuals varied 
consistently in their use of tactics across both non-variable and variable patch 
condi tions (F igure 2.2). Furthermore, the simulations 1 present in Chapter 1, show that 
individual differences can arise because of different early experi ences (F igure 1.1 ), 
even when individuals use similar learning mechani sms. lt is therefore important to 
be cautious about accepting thi s assumption, and to investigate the contexts under 
which it may or may not hold using both models and experiments. 
In a non-frequency dependent task, the optimal so lution is equi valent fo r all identica l 
individuals. We therefore might expect identical individuals to express similar 
behav iour even if they have different learning rules . 1 can think of only one case 
where we might expect persistent individual differences in a non-frequency 
dependent task. Severa! studies have shown that learning is costly. Animais may need 
to spend time sampling less profitable choices, fo r example. ln extreme cases, 
individuals may choose not to sample all choices and may thus end up with an 
inaccurate estimate of the diffe rent options. ln such an environment, individuals may 
express di ffe rent behav iour, with some individuals making what appear to be 
suboptimal choices. Based on Stephens ( 1989), we can expect these diffe rences to 
persist if the cost of dev iation from the optimal behav iour is smal Ier than the cost of 
obtaining the info rmation necessary to make the optimal choice. 
In a frequency-dependent task, on the other hand, each individual may experience a 
different environment due to the behav iour of other individuals. The optimal 
behaviour fo r each individual may therefore al so differ, and we can expect to observe 
individual differences . My simulations show that when individuals use same learning 
rule in a frequency-dependent task, diffe rent early experiences lead to temporal , and 
not persistent, individual differences over time (Figure 1.1 ). The next step would be 
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to see what happens when individuals differ intrinsically, hav ing either different 
learning ru les or the same learning ru le with diffe rent parameters. 
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APPENDIX A 
FINAL PROPORTION OF PURE, MIXED, AND LTNEAR OPERATOR 
STRA TEGlES WHEN COMPETTNG WITH EACH OTHER fN PRODUCER-
SCROUNGER GAME IN DYNAMIC ENYIRONM ENTS 
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